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The competition for power and influence between China and the United States in 
Southeast Asia has presented strategic uncertainties in the region. Vietnam, like the rest of 
Southeast Asia, has adopted a hedging strategy to minimize security and political risks, and 
maximize the diplomatic benefits of flexibility. In recent years, however, China’s 
increasing aggression in the South China Sea may have put pressure on Vietnam to balance 
against China. By using a hedging spectrum between balancing and bandwagoning, this 
thesis seeks to understand Vietnam’s hedging behavior in response to China’s aggression 
and the possible reasons for that degree of change. It examines how Vietnam continues to 
pursue contradictory hedging behaviors to address Hanoi’s low-intensity balancing 
policies toward China while providing a closer engagement and solidarity with Beijing. 
This thesis found that Vietnam’s hedging behavior has shifted toward the balancing end of 
the hedging spectrum. In addition, Vietnam continues to put greater emphasis on indirect-
balancing and dominance-denial policies, which also signify a degree of power rejection 
vis-à-vis China. 
This thesis offers two distinct explanations for Vietnam’s current trend toward the 
balancing behavior. First, through military modernization and security cooperation, 
Vietnam’s indirect balancing component has been strengthened, and second, Vietnam’s 
recent bilateral and multilateral enmeshment strategies have led it to a greater commitment 
to dominance denial, cultivating a balance of power and binding processes through 
institutionalist mechanisms. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis explores the last several years of Vietnam’s foreign relations with China. 
Since the end of the Cold War, many scholars agree that for the most part, Vietnam has 
demonstrated a clear policy of avoiding taking sides with either the United States or China. 
In international relations terms, this strategic option is often referred to as “hedging” and 
most scholars agree that Vietnam has “hedged.” However, China’s increasing aggression 
in the last few years, especially in the South China Sea, has put pressure on Vietnam to 
balance against China. In response, Vietnam has sought to improve its relations, including 
greater defense and economic ties with regional powers such as India, Japan, and the 
United States. These recent behaviors may indicate that Vietnam is more inclined to 
balance against China than to continue hedging. The purpose of this thesis is to determine 
to what degree Vietnam’s policy toward China has changed in recent years in response to 
China’s aggression and the possible reasons for that degree of change. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The last decade of American foreign policy in Asia has been challenged primarily 
by China’s rise as a regional hegemon. Given China’s economic and military development, 
many Southeast Asian nations are feeling pressured and tested by China’s strength. 
Southeast Asian states, and for the purpose of this thesis, specifically Vietnam, have also 
been caught in the changing balance of power between the United States and China. 
Understanding the factors that cause Vietnam to oppose or strategically align with China 
or the United States will enhance U.S. relations with Vietnam. This understanding would 
also promote effective U.S. policies and interests while improving the United States’ 
understanding of Vietnam’s pattern of foreign relations. Among the most accepted 
literature on Vietnam’s foreign policy is Le’s argument on why Vietnam has hedged 
against China. Le claims that since the 1990s, Vietnam has employed hedging as a logical 
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and feasible method of relations to China.1 However, Le’s article does not account for the 
time period after the article was written in 2013. Therefore, this thesis would like to add to 
the existing scholarship by examining Vietnam’s policy toward China to determine to what 
degree Vietnam policy has changed and the possible reasons for that change. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review is divided into three primary sections. The first section 
reviews the literature on international relations theory by defining balancing, 
bandwagoning, and hedging. It then summarizes the main reasons why small states, 
particularly in Southeast Asia choose to adopt one policy rather than the others. The second 
section reviews Vietnam’s hedging policy from the end of the Cold War (early 1990s) until 
the early 2010s. Since the early 2010s, China has been increasing its aggressive behavior 
in the South China Sea that has sent worrying signals not only to Vietnam but to the region 
as whole. The third section discusses the literature on Vietnam’s foreign policy since the 
early 2010s that has led some scholars to believe Vietnam may be inclined toward a 
balancing behavior against China rather than continuing its hedging policy. Finally, this 
paper summarizes the scholarship as to whether Vietnam has indeed shifted its policy and 
adopted a balancing approach against China.  
1. Balance, Bandwagon, or Hedge? 
In managing relations with great powers, realist theorists, such as Walt contend that 
smaller states have two distinct responses to threatening powers or threats: balancing or 
bandwagoning.2 Through balancing, states can engage with another power by forming 
alliances against the principal source of danger or threats to avoid domination.3 Walt 
                                                 
1 Hong Hiep Le, “Vietnam’s Hedging Strategy against China since Normalization,” Contemporary 
Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 13, no. 3 (2013): 333. 
2 Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security 9, 
no. 4 (1985): 8–13. Walt discusses “four factors that affect the level of threat that states may pose… 
Aggregate power is the state’s total resources that can pose threat to others; proximity power is the 
capability to project power based on distance; offensive power is the offensive capabilities that can provoke 
alliances; offensive intentions are the state’s aggressive appearance and are likely to provoke alliances 
against them.” 
3 Ibid., 5.  
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divides balancing into “hard balancing” and “soft balancing.”4 Hard balancing emphasizes 
military and economic means to attain security or alliances to keep the dominant power in 
check.5 Soft balancing is based on collaboration in regional or international forums to 
neutralize a rising power.6 While hard balancing normally focuses on keeping the rising 
power in check militarily, soft balancing addresses actions against specific policies rather 
than against the overall distribution of power itself.7  
Alternatively, states can also bandwagon with the threatening power, which is “to 
ally with the power that poses the threat.”8 Walt identifies two motives for states to 
bandwagon with rather than balance against the threatening power: first, by bandwagoning, 
states adopt a form of appeasement in order to avoid an attack on itself; and second, states 
may also hope to share the profits of victory with the dominant power.9 Schweller argues 
that unthreatened states also bandwagon for reasons other than security, since balancing 
can be costly and bandwagoning is done with the expectation to be on the winning side and 
making gains.10  
Walt argues that “balancing is preferable to bandwagoning” because states want to 
“preserve their freedoms rather than submitting to a potential hegemon.”11 States also 
choose to balance against the threat because it is “safer to balance than to hope that the 
threat will remain benevolent.”12 Walt concludes that strong neighboring states tend to 
form alliances to balance against the potential hegemon (or sources of threats) while small 
                                                 
4 Walt, “Alliances in a Unipolar World,” World Politics 61, no. 1 (2008): 100. 
5 Ibid., 100–01. 
6 Thazha Varkey Paul, James J Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann, Balance of Power: Theory and Practice 
in the 21st Century (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), 14; Walt, “Alliances in a Unipolar 
World,” 104. 
7 Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” 104–05. 
8 Ibid., 4. 
9 Ibid., 7–8. 
10 Randall L. Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back in,” 
International Security 19, no. 1 (1994).  
11 Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” 15. 
12 Ibid. 
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and weak states may choose to bandwagon simply because they lack the capabilities, or 
their security alliances are unattainable, or that there are no reassurances of allied support.13  
A different form of strategic option in response to a rising power is hedging. Unlike 
balancing or bandwagoning, hedging is variously defined by international relations 
scholars, but its main goal is the avoidance of over-reliance on an external power. In Asian 
security politics, Goh refers hedging as a “set of strategies aimed at avoiding a situation in 
which states cannot decide upon more straightforward alternatives such as balancing, 
bandwagoning, or neutrality.”14 Roy thinks hedging may or may not involve balancing, as 
small states seek to maintain more than one strategic option open against uncertainty.15 
These states also seek to maintain positive relations with great powers in the region through 
“low intensity balancing” that includes “internal balancing,” which is the strengthening of 
defensive capability.16  
Jackson identifies observable hedging indicators include “military strengthening 
(defense spending and qualitative improvements) without a declared adversary, increasing 
participation in voluntary (as opposed to rules-based) bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation, the absence of firm balancing or bandwagoning, and the 
simultaneous/equidistant improvement in relations with the two greatest regional 
powers.”17 Jackson also emphasizes two forms of hedging that are mostly seen in Southeast 
Asia. The first form is military strengthening through increase spending and investments 
on building defense. The second form incorporates economic and diplomatic enmeshment 
between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states and China.18  
                                                 
13 Ibid., 17–18. 
14 Evelyn Goh, “Meeting the China Challenge: The U.S. In Southeast Asian Regional Security 
Strategies,” Policy Studies, no. 16 (2005): 2. 
15 Denny Roy, “Southeast Asia and China: Balancing or Bandwagoning?,” Contemporary Southeast 
Asia 27, no. 2 (2005): 306. 
16 Ibid., 306, 10. 
17 Van Jackson, “Power, Trust, and Network Complexity: Three Logics of Hedging in Asian Security,” 
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 14, no. 3 (2014): 333–34. 
18 Ibid. 
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Kuik frames hedging as a “middle position” between the pure-balancing and pure-
bandwagoning while projecting a non-taking-side approach when the power structure is 
uncertain.19 Kuik’s hedging behaviors include indirect-balancing, dominance denial, 
economic pragmatism and diversification, binding engagement, and limited-
bandwagnoning.20 As seen in Figure 1, Kuik’s Power Rejection/Acceptance Spectrum 
provides the degree of flexibility that is useful for small states like Vietnam to pursue its 
hedging strategy. For this reason, this thesis will adopt Kuik’s hedging spectrum and will 
examine in greater detail throughout the paper. 
 
Figure 1.  Power Rejection/Acceptance Spectrum.21 
                                                 
19 Cheng-Chwee Kuik, “How Do Weaker States Hedge? Unpacking Asean States’ Alignment Behavior 
Towards China,” Journal of Contemporary China 25, no. 100 (2016): 3. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Source: Cheng-Chwee Kuik and Gilbert Rozman, “Light or Heavy Hedging: Positioning between 
China and the United States,” in Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies, ed. Gilbert Rozman (Washington, 
DC: Korea Economic Institute of America, 2015), 3. 
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According to Kuik, indirect-balancing is to “minimize security risks through 
military alignment and increasing armament without targeting any power”; dominance 
denial is to “minimize political risks of subservience by cultivating balance of political 
power in the region”; economic pragmatism is to “maximize economic benefits by forging 
economic and commercial links,” while economic diversification is to “minimize 
economic risks of dependence by diversifying economic links”; binding engagement is to 
“maximize diplomatic benefits by engaging and binding a big power in various 
institutionalized bilateral and multilateral platforms”; and limited bandwagoning is to 
“maximize political benefits by selectively giving deference and collaboration.”22  
Kuik conceives hedging as a “multiple component approach situated between the 
two ends of the balancing-bandwagoning spectrum.”23 With economic pragmatism and 
diversification as the neutrality point, Kuik calls indirect-balancing and dominance denial 
as the “risk-contingency option,” which tends to defy and reject the growing power and 
leans toward a balancing approach.24 Kuik also calls the binding engagement and limited-
bandwagoning as the “return-maximizing option,” which tends to please and accept the 
growing power and leans toward a bandwagoning approach.25 
In summary, this section defines three specific options or policies that small states 
can adopt when facing a rising power or threat. First, states can balance against the rising 
hegemon when they feel that their survival is at risk, so joining the alignment against the 
rising power is the preferred choice over the others. On the other hand, states can also 
bandwagon with the rising hegemon through appeasement while expecting stability and 
avoiding any attack on itself and hoping to share the spoils of victory with the dominant 
power.26 Lastly, while the common notion of hedging is the avoidance of over-reliance on 
any one state, small states will adopt hedging simply because it provides the middle ground 
                                                 
22 Kuik, “How Do Weaker States Hedge? Unpacking Asean States’ Alignment Behavior Towards 
China,” 502. 
23 Kuik and Rozman, “Light or Heavy Hedging: Positioning between China and the United States,” 3. 
24 Ibid., 3–4. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” 7–8. 
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to influence power politics and navigate between balancing and bandwagoning. Finally, 
Kuik contends that because of recent competitive Sino-US relations, Southeast Asian states 
have found substantial economic and diplomatic benefits “without over-betting on any 
options that may incur unnecessary price.”27  
2. Vietnam’s Hedging Policy since 1990s 
The following section serves three purposes. First, it shows that there is a consensus 
in the literature that Vietnam chose to hedge since the end of the Cold War, mainly from 
the 1990s to the early 2010s. Second, it describes how Vietnam hedged based on the 
definitions of hedging and hedging behaviors as explained by Kuik, Jackson, and others. 
Finally, this section proceeds to demonstrate how scholars explain why Vietnam hedged. 
Among the most significant scholarship on contemporary Vietnam policy is Le’s 
work on Vietnam’s hedging strategy against China since the 1990s. Le claims that when 
Vietnam normalized relations with China, its most practical option was to adopt a hedging 
policy given Vietnam’s “historical experiences, domestic and bilateral conditions, and… 
changes in Vietnam’s external relations and the international strategic environment.”28 In 
analyzing Southeast Asian regional security, Goh also argues that Vietnam had clearly 
demonstrated hedging behavior toward China because Hanoi understood that it had to 
“accommodate China given its lack of alternatives.”29 Similarly, Percival argues that 
Vietnam adopted a “defensive and weak” hedging strategy, whose goal is to benefit from 
China’s economic growth, but also importantly, to prevent China from dominating the 
Vietnamese economy.30 Roy argues that Vietnam practiced a very “subtle” case of hedging 
through low-level, highly restrained forms of balancing with the United States against 
                                                 
27 Cheng-Chwee Kuik, “Comparing Asean Core States’ Alignment Behavior: Variations on a 
(Hedging) Theme:,” Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies  (2015): 2–23. 
28 Le, “Vietnam’s Hedging Strategy against China since Normalization,” 333. 
29 Goh, “Meeting the China Challenge: The U.S. In Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies,” 23; 
ibid. 
30 Bronson Percival, The Dragon Looks South: China and Southeast Asia in the New Century 
(Wesport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2007), 43. 
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China. Most contemporary literature has provided evidence of Vietnam’s hedging strategy, 
but few scholars have focused on Vietnam’s bandwagoning approach.  
Le breaks Vietnam’s hedging strategy into four major components and details how 
Vietnam hedged, namely through economic pragmatism, direct engagement, hard 
balancing, and soft balancing.31 Le explains economic pragmatism as the deepening of 
bilateral economic cooperation to improve Sino-Vietnamese relations and to facilitate 
Vietnam’s domestic development.32 Through closer economic ties with China since the 
early 1990s, Le argues that Vietnam was able to achieve strong economic growth and 
opportunities offered by China’s economic rise.33 This hedging approach coincides with 
Kuik’s hedging spectrum that includes economic pragmatism behavior to maximize 
economic benefits.34  
Le then proceeds to explain direct engagement as the key mechanism for Hanoi to 
solidify trust and cooperation with Beijing to overcome differences in resolving land and 
maritime disputes while promoting common party interests.35 According to Le, between 
1991 and 2013, Vietnam and China had thirty-six visits by top party officials and state 
leaders to promote cooperation and build a political framework for bilateral relations.36 
Simultaneously, Le and Thayer noted that Hanoi had also extended and improved relations 
with Washington by stepping up defense and diplomatic talks since diplomatic 
normalization in 1995.37 This engagement behavior is in line with Jackson’s hedging 
indicator that is seen as improving relations with both powers without giving the perception 
                                                 
31 Le, “Vietnam’s Hedging Strategy against China since Normalization,” 344. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., 345. 
34 Kuik, “How Do Weaker States Hedge? Unpacking Asean States’ Alignment Behavior Towards 
China,” 502. Kuik explains economic pragmatism as the “neutrality point in which states seek to maximize 
economic benefits by forging economic and commercial links.” 
35 Le, “Vietnam’s Hedging Strategy against China since Normalization,” 344–46. 
36 Ibid., 347. 
37 Carlyle A. Thayer, “Vietnam’s Foreign Policy in an Era of Rising Sino-U.S. Competition and 
Increasing Domestic Political Influence,” Asian Security  (2017): 13; Le, “Vietnam’s Hedging Strategy 
against China since Normalization,” 357. 
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of bandwagoning or balancing.38 Equally, Kuik’s definition of dominance denial and Roy’s 
hedging behavior as explained earlier also fits with Vietnam’s engagement strategy.39 
The third component of Vietnam’s hedging strategy, according to Le, involves hard 
balancing, which calls for “domestic military modernization to deter China from aggressive 
actions” in the South China Sea.40 Le’s explanation for hard balancing, however, differs 
from Jackson’s definition of hedging and Kuik’s indirect-balancing behavior. Jackson 
considers military modernization (through defense spending and qualitative 
improvements) as hedging only if it is not directed at an adversary.41 Kuik’s indirect-
balancing behavior seeks to increase armament without directly targeting any power.42 
Nonetheless, Vietnam scholars have observed Hanoi’s hard balancing behavior when 
Vietnam gradually developed a stronger defense capability by acquiring modern hardware 
and developing its own domestic defense industry.43 Likewise, Cheng also asserts that 
Vietnam hedged in the beginning of the century by strengthening security ties with the 
United States and improving its defense capabilities.44  
The fourth component of Vietnam’s hedging strategy according to Le’s thesis is 
soft balancing, which describes Vietnam’s desire to join multilateral institutions while 
simultaneously pursuing relations with major powers.45 Between 2001 and 2011, Vietnam 
                                                 
38 Jackson, “Power, Trust, and Network Complexity: Three Logics of Hedging in Asian Security,” 333. 
39 Kuik, “How Do Weaker States Hedge? Unpacking Asean States’ Alignment Behavior Towards 
China,” 502; Roy, “Southeast Asia and China: Balancing or Bandwagoning?,” 305. Kuik explains 
dominance-denial as a “political hedging behavior in which states seek to minimize political risk of 
subservience by cultivating balance of political power in the region.” Roy defines hedging as a “strategy of 
low intensity balancing and seeking positive relations with all powers in the region.” 
40 Le, “Vietnam’s Hedging Strategy against China since Normalization,” 344, 51. 
41 Jackson, “Power, Trust, and Network Complexity: Three Logics of Hedging in Asian Security,” 333. 
42 Kuik, “How Do Weaker States Hedge? Unpacking Asean States’ Alignment Behavior Towards 
China,” 502. 
43 Carlyle A. Thayer, “Force Modernization: The Case of the Vietnam People’s Army,” Contemporary 
Southeast Asia 19, no. 1 (1997); Le, “Vietnam’s Hedging Strategy against China since Normalization,” 
351. 
44 Joseph Y.S. Cheng, “Sino-Vietnamese Relations in the Early Twenty-First Century,” Asian survey 
51, no. 2 (2011): 387. 
45 Le, “Vietnam’s Hedging Strategy against China since Normalization,” 344. 
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negotiated eight “strategic partnership” agreements, including one with China in 2008.46 
Vietnam also entered into “comprehensive partnerships” with Australia (2009) and the 
United States (2013).47 Le contends that Vietnam chose to develop these strategic and 
comprehensive partnership agreements with countries that are either political powers, 
economic powers, military powers, or countries that play significant role in the South China 
Sea disputes.48 This approach is generally in line with Kuik’s definition of binding-
engagement, which is a policy designed to “maximize diplomatic benefits by engaging and 
binding a big power in various institutionalized bilateral and multilateral platforms.”49 
Jackson’s hedging indicators also include increasing participation in bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation.50  
Thayer has described Vietnam’s foreign policy in ways that are similar to Le’s 
argument. Thayer offers a net assessment of Vietnam’s bilateral relations with China from 
1991 to 2008 that included a mix of hedging, engagement, and omni-enmeshment 
strategies.51 Thayer defines hedging as a “general strategy to keeping more than one option 
open” and that states can adopt concurrent strategies of engagement and hedging at the 
same time.52 According to Thayer, Vietnam’s engagement refers to establishing 
multifaceted relations with China in many areas and issues while also seeking to improve 
relations with the United States.53 This engagement policy matches Jackson’s hedging 
indicator of improving relations with both powers simultaneously.54 
                                                 
46 Carlyle A. Thayer, “The Philippines and Vietnam Forge a Strategic Partnership,”  The Diplomat 
2017 (March 10, 2015), http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/the-philippines-and-vietnam-forge-a-strategic-
partnership/. These agreements include these Russia (2001), Japan (2006), India (2007), China (2008), 
South Korea and Spain (2009), the United Kingdom (2010), and Germany (2011). 
47 Le, “Vietnam’s Hedging Strategy against China since Normalization,” 357. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Kuik, “How Do Weaker States Hedge? Unpacking Asean States’ Alignment Behavior Towards 
China,” 502. 
50 Jackson, “Power, Trust, and Network Complexity: Three Logics of Hedging in Asian Security,” 333. 
51 Carlyle A. Thayer, “The Structures of Vietnam-China Relations, 1991–2008” (paper presented at the 
the 3rd International Conference on Vietnamese Studies, Hanoi, Vietnam, 2008), 26–27. 
52 Ibid., 25. 
53 Ibid., 26. 
54 Jackson, “Power, Trust, and Network Complexity: Three Logics of Hedging in Asian Security,” 333. 
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Thayer also added that Vietnam adopted an omni-enmeshment strategy, which 
included membership in ASEAN and other regional multilateral organizations such as the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to manage relations with China.55 Though Thayer used 
omni-enmeshment to describe Vietnam’s policy toward China, it should be noted that 
Thayer’s definition of omni-enmeshment strategy also matches Goh’s definition as well, 
which is the “process of engaging with a state to draw deep involvement into international 
or regional forums and enveloping it in a web of sustained exchanges and relationships, 
with the long-term aim of integration.”56 Kuik’s binding-engagement definition is also 
consistent with the definition of omni-enmeshment.57 In his 2011 paper, Thayer again 
argued that Vietnam used three primary strategies when dealing with China: first, utilize 
high-level party-to-party talks; second, promote multilateral efforts to enmesh China; and 
third, develop its own self-sufficient capacity for defense and military modernization.58 
These three strategies offer similar approach that Le presented with his hedging 
components of direct engagement, soft balancing, and hard balancing. 
There are several distinct reasons why Vietnam adopted a hedging strategy from 
the 1990s to early 2010s. Starting with the historical perspective, scholars argue that one 
of the reasons why Vietnam hedged was because it questioned the reliability of external 
alliances.59 In the late 1970s, Hanoi had a mutual defense treaty with the former Soviet 
Union in balancing against China, but received limited defense and security assistance from 
Moscow during its brief border war with China in 1979.60 This experience gave Vietnam a 
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lesson to not trust in alliances and gave Vietnamese leaders a wakeup call to diversity its 
foreign relations without any significant level of dependence on any external power.61 
The second reason why Vietnam adopted a hedging policy was because it lacked 
any strategic alliance with any other state that could help it balance against China in the 
1990s.62 While the United States might be seen as a potential partner in balancing against 
China, scholars argue that Vietnamese leaders tend to have reservations about establishing 
deeper ties with the United States, since the U.S. Congress tends to demand progress on 
political reforms that represent threats to Vietnam’s communist regime stability.63 
The third reason is Vietnam’s fear for its own security and the historical perception 
of China as a threat. While Vietnam wished to maintain favorable relations with China, 
Goh argues that China has also been the biggest external threat to Vietnam’s security. As 
such, China has always been the key strategic concern in shaping Vietnam’s hedging 
policy.64 Therefore, Goh argues that hedging (as well as enmeshment) allowed Vietnam to 
establish broader defense cooperation with regional powers that shared security concerns. 
Simultaneously Vietnam has continued to retain its close relationship with China.65 
In summary, this section provides three main points. First, it demonstrates that there 
is a consensus in the literature that Vietnam chose to hedge rather than balance or 
bandwagon since the 1990s. And second, it describes from the existing literature how 
Vietnam hedged based on observable indicators from Jackson and various definitions of 
hedging and hedging behaviors from Kuik. This section then proceeds to narrow down 
three main reasons why Vietnam chose to hedge from the 1990s to the early 2010s.  
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3. Vietnam’s Hedging Policy since 2010 
This section of the literature review focuses on the Vietnam’s foreign policy from 
the early 2010s to the present. This section aims to do two things. First, it highlights some 
of the reasons Vietnam may be inclined to shift its policy in the direction of balancing 
against China rather than to continue hedging as it did from the 1990s to early 2010s. 
Second, it shows why some analysts believe Vietnam has shifted toward a balancing 
approach.  
During the period from 2001 to 2008, there were various incidents and causes of 
tension between China and Vietnam in the South China Sea, but the two countries generally 
managed to move on and put greater emphasis on conflict management.66 However, since 
the early 2010s, China has been increasing its assertiveness in the South China Sea through 
land reclamation and territorial claims that have sent worrying signals not only to Vietnam, 
but to the region as well. One major point of escalation occurred in May 2014 when China 
moved its deep-water drilling rig Haiyang Shiyou 981 inside Vietnam’s Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ).67 According to Le, the oilrig crisis served as the turning point that 
triggered security panic among the Vietnamese leadership, signaled the limitations of 
Vietnam’s hedging strategy, and revealed the need for Vietnam to shift its China strategy.68   
Le highlighted four main reasons why Vietnam would be more inclined to shift its 
policy in the direction of balancing against China.69 First, Vietnam was motivated toward 
balancing by China’s aggressive actions in the 2014 oil rig crisis, unprecedented since their 
1988 skirmish in the Spratly islands. Second, the crisis showed the asymmetry in power 
and capabilities between the two countries, where Vietnam’s military force was dwarfed 
by China’s overwhelming power. Third, the crisis showed Vietnam China’s willingness to 
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use force and ignored the de-escalation agreement between both countries regarding the 
South China Sea. And fourth, the crisis also displayed significant international support for 
Vietnam from powerful partners, including the United States and Japan.70  
Since the 2014 oil rig crisis, scholars have noted that Vietnam has deepened its 
perception of China as a serious security threat, raised the possibility of “alliance politics” 
with key partners, and emphasized greater defense modernization.71 In addition, Vietnam 
has come to reposition its “three nos” policy, which entails Vietnam’s principle of “no 
military alliance, no siding with one country against another, and no foreign military bases 
on its soil.”72 Thayer argues that the crisis demonstrated Vietnam was capable of 
“struggling against” China and determined to defend its national interests.73 In addition, 
London and Thayer assert that the increasing trend in Vietnamese public opinion on 
territorial disputes along with strong anti-China sentiment has caused Vietnam to hasten 
its approach toward the United States to balance against China.74 Such balancing behaviors 
include greater defense cooperation with the United States through joint military 
exchanges, modernizing its military, and developing defense partnerships with regional 
powers who share similar perceptions of interests and threats in the South China Sea.75  
Another reason why Hanoi may have shifted toward a balancing approach is 
because Vietnam believes it now has greater resources and options to handle diplomatic 
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and military pressures from China than Vietnam had in the 1990s.76 This is mostly revealed 
in Vietnam’s efforts against China in recent years by utilizing regional institutions to 
balance against China.77 Recall that Walt’s definition of soft balancing is based on 
collaboration in regional or international forums to manage or neutralize a rising power’s 
policies rather than its overall distribution of power.78 Likewise, Vietnam has continuously 
pushed for a stronger stand against Chinese aggressiveness in the South China Sea at 
regional and international forums such as the ASEAN ministerial meetings and ARF.79  
Overall, in answering the question whether Vietnam has leaned toward balancing 
against China or is still hedging as it did from the 1990s to early 2010s, two main Vietnam 
scholars offer some insight. First, Le argues that Vietnam’s politics against China can be 
strengthened with key partners who share “convergent interests and threat perceptions in 
the South China Sea” without the need for a formal military alliance against China.80 Le 
concludes that Vietnam is still hedging because balancing would limit Vietnam’s options 
and worsen its already tense relations with China.81 Thayer would agree with Le that 
Vietnam is still hedging.82 Thayer argues that while the balance of power theory would say 
that Vietnam is allying with the United States against China, Vietnam is instead choosing 
to protect its independence by adopting a defense policy that renounces joining alliances.83 
Thayer asserts that by strengthening ties, diversifying strategic partnerships, and promoting 
economic and political integration, Hanoi can protect its autonomy and ensure that Vietnam 
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does not become “entrapped in the increasing great power rivalry between the United States 
and China.”84  
In summary, the literature review provides brief background on balancing, 
bandwagoning, and hedging. It also identifies the main reasons why small states, 
particularly in Southeast Asia, choose to adopt one policy rather than the others. The 
second section of the literature shows that there is a general consensus that Vietnam hedged 
from the 1990s to early 2010s and how Vietnam hedged during that timeframe matches 
with observable indicators and definitions of hedging as defined by scholars. It also 
identifies some of the major reasons why Vietnam hedged. The third section highlights the 
reasons why Vietnam may be inclined to shift its policy in the direction of balancing against 
China rather than to continue hedging as it did from the 1990s to early 2010s.  
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATION AND HYPOTHESIS 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine to what degree Vietnam’s policy toward 
China has changed since the early 2010s in response to China’s aggression and the reasons 
for that change. The literature review offers a few potential explanations on why Vietnam 
is motivated to balance against China’s rise or why Vietnam stays on the hedging track. 
This section aims to offer four potential explanations to Vietnam’s policy in recent years. 
One potential explanation for Vietnam’s drive to balance against China is due to 
the latter’s increasing assertion in the South China Sea, which may have revealed some of 
the limitations of Vietnam’s hedging strategy.85 China’s push to control almost the entirety 
of the South China Sea has also carried with it the aggression and the military power that 
Vietnam knows it cannot match. In addition, China’s willingness to use force in the South 
China Sea against Vietnam has motivated Vietnam to balance against China by pursuing 
greater military modernization and defense ties with other powers in the region. 
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The second potential explanation for Vietnam to adopt a balancing approach is due 
to the increasing trend in Vietnamese public opinion on territorial disputes with China.86 
Vietnamese public opinion along with strong anti-China sentiment may have caused the 
Vietnamese government to hasten its approach toward the United States to balance against 
China. 
The third potential explanation stems from Vietnam’s confidence and the 
perception that Vietnam is strong enough in its effort to balance against China. Tensions 
between Vietnam and China in the South China Sea have generally garnered international 
support for Vietnam from powerful partners, including the United States and Japan.87 
Additionally, Vietnam is now more confident. It believes it is stronger and has greater 
resources, support, and options by utilizing regional institutions to handle diplomatic and 
military pressures from China than Vietnam had in the 1990s. Thus, soft balancing through 
collaboration in ASEAN or other international bodies can be used to manage or neutralize 
China’s policies rather than to directly challenge China’s overall power. 
The fourth potential explanation, however, argues that Vietnam continues to stay 
on the hedging track because of several reasons. First, by continuing to hedge, Vietnam 
will have greater options to manage its already tense relations with China.88 Second, 
hedging provides Vietnam with greater autonomy and independence.89 In addition, 
Vietnam’s alliance experience with the Soviet Union makes Hanoi reluctant to depend 
heavily on any external power.90 Furthermore, allying with the United States in balancing 
against China may weaken the regime because of U.S. demands for political 
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liberalization.91 Therefore, Vietnam would likely continue to employ hedging strategy by 
diversifying and promoting economic and political integration to ensure that it does not 
suffer collateral damage by rising tensions. Lastly, Vietnam’s hedging strategy may also 
include some form of low intensity balancing components from the previous three 
explanations. 
This proposal hypothesizes that Vietnam is still pursuing a policy of hedging 
against China. Given China’s ambitions for military and economic growth, the South China 
Sea disputes will likely continue to escalate in the near future. If Vietnam shifts its policy 
toward balancing, then China may respond by boosting its military presence in the area and 
retaliating with economic and political sanctions. Therefore, Vietnam’s hedging strategy 
offers the flexibility to deal with China’s behavior while projecting a non-taking-side 
approach and keeping its own position when the power structure in the region is uncertain. 
Hedging also provides Vietnam the middle ground to navigate between the balancing and 
bandwagoning spectrum, while maintaining its positive relations with great powers 
“without over-betting on any options that may incur unnecessary price.”92 Finally, hedging 
also offers Vietnam the option to maintain favorable relations with China as the eminent 
rising power.  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis will be organized around contemporary literature on Vietnam foreign 
policies. In addition, published news articles and academic political analyses of Vietnam 
foreign policies account for most of the secondary sources used for this thesis. Vietnam’s 
historical trends in maintaining strong political and economic ties with China are well 
documented due to its proximity in geography, but recent Chinese threat perception has 
presented greater challenge for Vietnam and has driven it to broaden relations with regional 
powers, most notably the United States, Japan, and India. However, Vietnam is reluctant 
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to allow relations with the United States to reach full potential for fear of Chinese reprisal 
and regime change. In considering, this thesis attempts to determine how much of 
Vietnam’s policy has changed since the early 2010s in response to China’s aggression and 
the reasons for that change. 
This thesis will further examine evidence in recent years to determine whether 
Vietnam is still hedging as hypothesized by adopting Kuik’s Power Rejection/Acceptance 
Spectrum. This thesis will explore evidence through two case studies. The first case study 
is on Vietnam’s military modernization effort. The second case study is on Vietnam’s 
binding-engagement to maximize its diplomatic benefits through institutionalized bilateral 
and multilateral platforms. Both case studies will examine evidence since the early 2010s 
to determine whether it matches with Kuik’s definition of hedging behaviors based on the 
Power Rejection/Acceptance Spectrum. Finally, both case studies will offer assessment 
about the causes of Vietnam’s policy choices and determine whether they are similar to or 
different from the reasons why Vietnam hedged in the 1990s, and lastly, determine if there 
is any inclination toward balancing behavior. 
The first case study will focus on Vietnam’s military modernization. Vietnam’s 
military upgrades and modernizations are not new, but recent years have seen Vietnam 
significantly boosted its defense spending. These spending have been concentrated on 
defense, importing modern hardware and growing its own defense industry. Given a long 
coastline facing the South China Sea and the majority of its population living along the 
coast, Vietnam sees the South China Sea as a strategic pathway for economic growth and 
development. Therefore, developing a capable and modern military is in the best interest 
of Vietnam to protect its sovereignty. While the territorial disputes between China and 
Vietnam in South China Sea often define the characteristics of Sino-Vietnamese 
relationship, this case study will not provide a detailed analysis of this issue. Instead, this 
case study will focus on how Vietnam is hedging by analyzing Vietnam’s military 
modernization and defense relations with regional partners.  
In the second case study, Vietnam’s strategy has been to engage and bind China 
through various institutionalized bilateral and multilateral platforms. Binding-engagement, 
as explained earlier in the Literature Review section, can be thought of as a policy designed 
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to increase participation in various institutions in order to maximize diplomatic benefits 
and manage relations with the rising power. In doing so, Vietnam establishes broader 
defense cooperation with international and regional powers, including China, and 
enveloping it in order to meet Vietnam’s agendas. Vietnam knows it alone cannot compete 
with China militarily or economically, but through regional defense and economic 
institutions, Vietnam may have higher chance of influencing China’s long-term behaviors. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis is structured into four chapters. The first chapter establishes the 
international relations theory and Vietnam’s historical and current policy toward China. 
The second chapter examines the causes and implication of Vietnam’s military 
modernization effort. The third chapter focuses on Vietnam’s binding-engagement effort 
through regional and international forums (enmeshment). The fourth chapter offers a final 
assessment about the causes of Vietnam’s policy choices and determines whether they are 
similar to or different from the reasons why Vietnam hedged in the 1990s. Lastly, the 
chapter assesses the inclination of Vietnam moving toward a balancing behavior.  
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II. VIETNAM’S MILITARY MODERNIZATION 
The Vietnamese People’s Army (VPA) military upgrades are not new, but recent 
years have seen Vietnam significantly boost its defense spending through acquiring modern 
hardware and developing its domestic defense industry. This chapter discusses Vietnam’s 
military modernization effort since the beginning of 2010s. The chapter is divided into 
three sections. The first outlines the details of Vietnam’s military modernization efforts 
through procurements from foreign partners and development of its own defense industry. 
The second section then identifies the causes of Vietnam’s defense modernization. Finally, 
the last section concludes with an analysis of Vietnam’s overall defense modernization to 
support this study’s argument that Vietnam is hedging by applying Kuik’s Power 
Rejection/Acceptance Spectrum and Jackson’s definition of hedging.  
A. MILITARY MODERNIZATION IN VIETNAM 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Vietnam has transformed from a once 
diplomatically isolated country to having one of the most dynamic and complex defense 
policies in Southeast Asia. The doi moi economic reform that started in 1986 had positioned 
Vietnam toward military modernization through importing modern hardware and growing 
its own defense industry.93 Vietnam’s 2009 National Defense White Paper stated: 
In order to provide enough weapons and technological equipment for the 
armed forces, in addition to well maintaining and selectively upgrading 
existing items, Vietnam makes adequate investments to manufacture on its 
own certain weapons and equipment commensurate with its technological 
capabilities, while procuring a number of modern weapons and 
technological equipment to meet the requirements of enhancing the combat 
strength of its people’s armed forces. (Ministry of National Defense, 2009) 
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimated that 
Vietnam increased its military spending by 200 percent from 2007 to 2017. In terms of 
military expenditure, Vietnam spent about $5 billion on defense in 2016, compared to 
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China’s $255 billion and the United States’ $522 billion in the same period.94 In addition, 
Vietnam inked numerous defense contracts with multiple partners, which put Vietnam as 
the world’s eighth largest importer of weapons systems from 2011 to 2015.95 Thayer 
estimates that naval acquisitions accounted for 53 percent of the VPA’s arms, air force 
acquisitions represented 25 percent, missiles 12 percent, air defense systems, sensors, and 
engines accounted 9.7 percent in 2016. Thayer argues that these figures “confirm Vietnam 
has placed priority on improving its naval and air capabilities, especially for maritime 
missions, air defense and maritime domain awareness.”96 The following sections will 
examine Vietnam’s weapons acquisition and its growing defense industry. 
1. Weapons Procurement 
Russia remains Vietnam’s main weapons supplier despite the breakup of the Soviet 
Union and its withdrawal from Southeast Asia. In fact, over 80 percent of Vietnam’s 
military hardware remains Russian, which makes Vietnam’s military virtually integrated 
with Russian hardware and defense systems, which also mirrors Russian tactical and 
operational experience.97 With regard to Vietnam’s procurement of Russian hardware, 
Hanoi has ordered six Russian-built state-of-the-art Kilo class submarines, five of which 
have been delivered to Vietnam and the entire fleet expected to be fully operational in 
2017.98 Two Gepard vessels are already in service with the Vietnamese navy for anti-
submarine warfare.99 In addition, Vietnam has ordered four more Gepard-class frigates 
from Russia and expects to build four Molniya-class corvettes under license.100 The 
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Vietnamese Air Force is almost entirely equipped with a fleet of 30 Russian-supplied 
Sukhoi-30 fighter-bombers and older Russian built Sukhoi-27s. In general, the majority of 
maintenance, repair, or logistics network is geared toward Russian technology, so Vietnam 
will continue to see Russia as its main supplier of arms in the foreseeable future.101  
In addition to a wealth of Russian hardware, Vietnam has sought to acquire 
weapons and receive military training from various countries, particularly India. Vietnam 
and India signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in 2007 to step up defense ties 
on training, exchanges, and port visits. Since then, Vietnamese pilots, officers, and 
submariners have attended basic technical courses at Indian bases.102 As major importers 
of Russian defense systems, both India and Vietnam share a high degree of system 
interoperability. For this reason, India is helping Vietnam upgrade its Petya-class light 
frigates for anti-submarine warfare and expanding its service program to upgrade existing 
Vietnamese stocks of Soviet-era military equipment, including armored vehicles, tanks, 
and helicopters.103 Vietnam’s increasing preference for Indian hardware in terms of 
military procurement is important as it can lessen Vietnam’s dependency on Russian 
arms.104 Recently, India has setup a satellite tracking and imaging center in Vietnam in 
exchange for Hanoi’s access to ISR capabilities from Indian observation satellites that 
cover the South China Sea.105 Furthermore, India has offered Vietnam a $500 million line 
of credit for defense purchases and $5 million to set up a military information technology 
software in southern Vietnam.106 
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Vietnam’s multilateral relations also come with benefits and flexibility to purchase 
weapons from countries outside of Asia. Even though Vietnam still depends on Russian 
military equipment, it has begun to import armaments from Europe. According to 
information provided by the U.S. Embassy in Hanoi, these European armaments have been 
purchased by Vietnam through direct commercial sale.107 In one instance in 2012, Vietnam 
purchased three of Airbus’ military C212-400 from the European Aeronautic Defense and 
Space Company (EADS) through FMS.108 Additionally, Vietnam is also considering 
purchasing Israel’s advanced Delilah standoff-range air-to-surface missile that is capable 
of extreme accuracy when fitted with Russian-made fighters.109 Another weapon system 
that Vietnam acquired from Israel was the SPYDER anti-air missile system that can destroy 
airborne targets such as aircraft, cruise missiles, and UAVs in any weather conditions.110 
The United States’ entry into Vietnam’s defense market came in summer 2016 
when the Obama Administration lifted the lethal arms embargo against Vietnam in a sign 
of increased military cooperation and investments in Vietnam.111 Since then, Vietnam has 
contemplated purchasing Lockheed Martin’s P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft, F-16 
fighters, and other military systems for surveillance and air defense.112 In an interview, 
Senior Lieutenant General and former Director of National Defense Academy Nguyen Tien 
Trung reiterated that “Vietnam’s goal is to aim for the development of military technology, 
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producing some ourselves and buying technologies and modern weapons from 
conventional arms-dealer countries.” Trung also emphasized that Vietnam’s purchase from 
the United States would include vehicles, not weapons, that are compatible with Vietnam’s 
current weapons systems, such as surveillance aircraft, patrol ships, aircrafts and 
lifeboats.113  
2. Domestic Defense Industry 
In addition to Vietnam’s procurement of advanced weapons from foreign partners, 
Vietnam is also developing its domestic defense industrial capability through overseas 
partnerships and technology transfers. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Vietnam 
understood that its defense policy required a new arms source for its military.114 This arms 
industry was needed to satisfy Vietnam’s aging systems’ requirement for repairs and 
upgrades on weapons and equipment for the armed forces.115 One area where the VPA 
helps leading to its modernization progress is its active involvement the production of 
weapons and military hardware.116 By the late 2000s, the Vietnamese government enacted 
the Ordinance on Defense Industry to provide the VPA an outline in developing domestic 
arms production.117 Since then, Vietnam has produced a variety of weapons, ranging from 
small arms such as mortars, automatic grenade launchers, and basic unmanned aerial 
vehicles.118  
Vietnam’s small, underdeveloped, yet growing, domestic defense capability 
currently offers limited opportunities for foreign companies to venture into the Vietnamese 
domestic defense market; however, foreign firms are seeing more opportunities as Vietnam 
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relaxes its regulatory framework for defense equipment and services to Vietnam.119 
Moreover, foreign investors have been encouraged by technology transfer deals, co-
production, and service agreements to do business with Vietnam.120 These countries 
include Belarus, India, the Netherlands, and the Ukraine.121 
As Vietnam seeks to widen the spectrum of international partnerships, it also wants 
to lessen its dependency on Russian hardware, while expanding collaboration with 
diversified partners.122 Vietnam’s domestic defense industry strategy encompasses not only 
traditional partnerships, but also extends to nations that Vietnam considers partners in 
economic trade and technology transfer. For example, Israel has become one of Vietnam’s 
biggest partners in research, development, and technology transfer, especially in the 
security and defense sector.123 Conversely, Vietnam produces Israeli arms under license, 
specifically, a type of Israeli drone that is capable of loitering up to 52 hours duration at 
35,000 ft.124 In addition, Vietnam is also seeking to purchase and, in collaboration with 
Israel’s state-owned Israel Military Industries, to manufacture weapon systems that include 
advanced tank rounds, artillery systems, and precision artillery rockets designed for long 
range.125 Other notable Vietnamese partnerships include an agreement with the 
Netherlands in assisting Vietnam to design and produce both commercial and military 
vessels.126 Lastly, Vietnam also has technology transfers agreement with Russia that 
enables Vietnam to produce its own anti-surface warfare missiles and using Russia’s own 
design.127 
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In summary, Vietnam’s increasing trend toward military modernization and 
defense cooperation with regional powers have proven to be a success story in Vietnam’s 
full international integration since doi moi reform. First, Vietnam has expanded its weapons 
suppliers to encompass multiple partners instead of relying mainly on Russia’s weapons 
systems. Second, Vietnam has developed notable homegrown shipbuilding programs, 
along with UAV and missile technologies by promoting research, development, and 
technology transfer from partner nations. These two notable characteristics for defense 
modernization have given Vietnam greater access to its training, exercises, security 
assistance, and defense equipment cooperation.  
B. CAUSES OF MILITARY MODERNIZATION 
Given the majority of Vietnam’s population living along the coast facing the South 
China Sea, Hanoi sees the South China Sea as a strategic pathway for economic growth 
and development. Therefore, developing a capable and modern military is in the best 
interest of Vietnam to protect its sovereignty and economic gains. There are two main 
potential explanations for the cause of Vietnam’s military modernization. The first and 
most commonly accepted explanation is the rise of Chinese aggressive behavior in the 
South China Sea. The second explanation is the economic effect, which argues that 
Vietnam’s economic growth since doi moi reform has provided opportunity for Vietnam 
to modernize and upgrade its military capabilities. This section will examine both 
explanations. 
1. China as a Factor 
One of the most prominent issues Vietnam faces is the heightened tension with 
China over the South China Sea disputes, which has led Vietnam to strengthen its military 
for possible future armed conflict with China. The past few years have seen China 
enforcing its claims of over 90 percent of the sea; these enforcements include a Chinese 
naval ship opening fire at Vietnam’s and other states’ fishing vessels, allegedly damaging 
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Vietnamese research ships, and placing oil-rigs inside Vietnam’s territorial waters.128 
These confrontations at sea have greatly intensified the anti-China sentiments and 
nationalism in Vietnam. Moreover, Vietnam stands out as the one of the most, if not the 
most critical of China’s assertion and influence among ASEAN.129  
While the territorial disputes between China and Vietnam in the South China Sea 
within the last decade have often defined the characteristics of Sino-Vietnamese 
relationships, it should be noted that tensions between the two countries have persisted for 
centuries. Even though both countries share the same political ideology, China remains the 
biggest external security threat to Vietnam and is one of the major factors in shaping 
Vietnam’s foreign relations.130 Furthermore, Vietnam has long been wary of China’s 
intentions, especially along its northern border and China’s oil exploration off its coasts. 
From the Vietnamese perspective, disputes over land as well as control over the South 
China Sea have been viewed as an extension of China’s physical territorial grab from its 
imperialistic past.131 This perception is substantiated by the frequent military conflicts with 
China over the last fifty years, most notably from China’s takeover of the Paracel Islands 
from Vietnam in 1974, then a punitive invasion in 1979, and China’s occupation of the 
Johnson South Reef in 1988. 
In 2009, Vietnam and Malaysia issued a joint submission to the United Nations 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf to define and claim Vietnam’s 12 
nautical miles from the coast of its landmass pursuant to Article 76 of the 1982 United 
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Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).132 China responded by submitting 
its imprecise nine-dash line, claiming close to the entirely of the South China Sea.133 Since 
then, scholars and news-outlets have reported increased Chinese activities to enforce 
China’s maritime claim by imposing fishing bans, seizing fishing vessels, harassing ships 
conducting explorations, issuing bids for oil exploration in contested waters, and building 
military structures on key features in the South China Sea.134 
In 2009, Vietnam’s National Defense White Paper listed the disputes and 
challenges to national sovereignty and territorial integrity in the South China Sea as a major 
traditional threat facing the country.135 Thayer emphasizes that because “Vietnam’s 
strategic environment has become more complex due to the rise of China and the 
modernization of the People’s Liberation Army…greater emphasis has been placed on 
Vietnam’s capabilities to protect its offshore territorial claims.”136 According to the Asia 
Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI), Vietnam issued its 2011 White Paper on defense 
detailing maritime strategy for 2011–2020 that required “making the protection of maritime 
sovereignty and the maritime economy key national security pillars.”137 In 2014, former 
Defense Minister General Phung Quang Thanh stressed the importance of developing a 
modernized army to “protect territorial integrity in the new situation [that] requires 
synergy… and modern weapons and equipment… to be able to protect the airspace, waters, 
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and territorial integrity of the country.”138 Again, at the Twelfth National Party Congress 
in 2016, the newly appointed Defense Minister General Ngo Xuan Lich reiterated the 
country’s need to “strengthen the formation of an official, elite, and modern army with 
high synergies and combat readiness, which will be the pivotal force in national defense.” 
General Lich also cautioned that “Vietnam will face several challenges and difficulties as 
the situation in the East Vietnam Sea (South China Sea) is expected to intensify, requiring 
much more efforts in building and defending the nation.”139 
Events of the past decade in the South China Sea further confirmed Vietnam’s 
interpretation of China’s growing assertiveness as a continuing threat to its sovereignty. 
China’s assertiveness also demonstrated its determination to make the area solely for its 
strategic purposes. In May and June of 2011, Vietnamese ships, operated by state-run 
energy company PetroVietnam, had their cables cut by Chinese naval patrol boats while 
conducting underwater survey of the South China Sea within Vietnam’s Exclusive 
Economic Zones (EEZ).140 Although China denied the allegation that it had cut the cables, 
it also blamed Vietnam for the tensions and the troubles it had caused by violating China’s 
sovereignty.141 These actions and confrontations between Chinese and Vietnamese vessels 
promoted anti-Chinese protests in Hanoi. In March 2012, China detains Vietnamese 
fishermen close to the Paracel Islands, claiming that they had been fishing in Chinese 
waters illegally.142  
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A serious point of escalation occurred in May 2014 when China moved its deep-
water drilling rig Haiyang Shiyou 981 inside Vietnam’s EEZ.143 This incident sparked 
major territorial disputes and further complicated relationship between the two countries 
as both sides exchanged heated maritime claims. Vietnam claimed that the oilrig was about 
70 miles inside its EEZ. China claimed that the oilrig was within its claim to the Paracel 
Islands, which China controls. That same month, a Vietnamese fishing boat sank near the 
oilrig after being rammed by a Chinese vessel.144 This incident caused massive anti-
Chinese protests in Hanoi and other major cities throughout Vietnam, which saw over a 
dozen Chinese factories damaged or destroyed by protesters.145 For the international 
community, this series of protests marked the most serious bilateral relations since both 
counties normalized relations.146 Vietnam formally logged complaints to China and 
initiated top-level discussions with the Chinese leadership. In response, China denied 
Vietnam’s negotiation requests and continued to park its oil rig until mid-July 2014.147  
In June 2017, Vietnam was forced to halt its gas drilling exploration project with a 
subsidiary of the Spanish company Repsol after China reportedly threatened to attack 
Vietnamese bases in the Spratly Islands.148 The site of the drilling was about 400 kilometers 
off Vietnam’s southeast coast in the disputed waters. Thayer asserts that the threats are “an 
alarming escalation of Chinese assertiveness and forms part of an emerging pattern of 
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increased Chinese bellicosity.”149 In addition, the threat also has long-term consequences 
for Vietnam, including the possibility of scaring away foreign oil foreign companies and 
more significantly, limiting Vietnam’s future energy security.150 
2. Economic Growth as a Factor 
A second explanation for Vietnam’s military modernization points to its success in 
doi moi economic renovations. Vietnam’s economic liberalization and gross domestic 
product (GDP) growth since the 1990s have provided Hanoi the opportunity to replace its 
outdated weapons and upgrade capabilities because its economy can allow it and there are 
more available resources.151 According to the ICD Research on Vietnamese Defense 
Industry, there is a strong correlation between Vietnam’s economic growth and its quest 
for military modernization.152 This explanation for Vietnam’s military modernization, 
therefore, rests upon the premise that China is not the target for Vietnam’s military 
upgrades, but rather Vietnam’s domestic drive to modernize the VPA and its defense 
industry. This explanation assumes that Hanoi is preparing for the worst-case scenario in 
an event of an attack in the future. This explanation also rests on the premise that Vietnam, 
and most other Southeast Asian countries, have also increased military spending in an intra-
ASEAN military competition.  
The notion that economic rise is a major contributing factor to military growth is 
not a new one, as many countries have experienced military strengthening following strong 
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economic growth.153 In addition, research has found that today’s fast-growing economies 
often dedicate an increasing share of their national resources to defense expenditures when 
the “external environment appears highly unstable.”154  
Since the early 1990s, Vietnam has listed the “danger of falling behind neighboring 
countries economically” as one of the “four threats” facing the country.155 In response, 
Vietnamese leaders needed to focus on the economy.156 This new strategic direction allows 
Vietnam to develop and adopt a “strong economy, just enough for national defense 
capability, and expanded international relations.”157 More recently, at a press interview, 
former Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung stated that since Vietnam has a long coastline, 
which “requires protection, and therefore, armed forces modernization is not a matter of 
contingency or arms race.”158 Dung went on to say that “we modernize our armed forces 
when the economic conditions allow, and that is normal.”159 Furthermore, Thayer argues 
that Vietnam’s orders of additional Russian fighter aircraft was “linked to economic 
growth.”160  
In addition to strong economic growth contributing to arms modernization, the 
VPA itself has also ushered in various ways of modernization through state-owned 
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enterprises. As early as the late 1950s, the VPA has included economic development in its 
mission to provide national defense.161 Since then, it is estimated that there are over 100 
VPA-managed enterprises and 20 foreign-invested companies that are operational in 
several sectors of the national economy.162 The doi moi economic reform further increased 
Vietnam’s economic development and opened the country’s economy to new markets and 
foreign investments. In addition, Vietnam’s pursuit to be an industrialized nation by 2020 
has provided impetus for the VPA to further modernize its capabilities and build a stronger 
defense industry.163 Vietnam’s push to achieve industrialized status and the VPA’s 
involvement in economic development both likely strengthened Hanoi’s motivation to 
increase its spending and international defense cooperation.  
In summary, two main potential causes have been presented for Vietnam’s military 
modernization: heightened tension with China over the South China Sea territorial claim 
and strong economic performance giving growth to military modernization. First, this 
section demonstrates that Vietnam views China as its chief security concern to sovereignty, 
energy security, and economic interest, especially with recent issues regarding the South 
China Sea disputes. Since China will continue to need more energy for its growing military 
and economic capabilities, Vietnam will likely maintain tension-filled relations with its 
giant neighbor. Although Vietnam’s military is no match for China’s well-equipped and 
modern armed forces, Vietnam has been perceived as investing in a deterrent capacity by 
acquiring weapons and modernizing its forces.  
This section also offers an alternate cause for Vietnam’s military modernization, 
which leans heavy on the economic growth since doi moi reform. Vietnam has been able 
to achieve military modernization by committing a growing share of the government’s 
economy and resources to its defense. These expenses were mainly done by acquiring 
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military hardware and developing domestic defense industry. By increasing Vietnam’s 
military expenditures, the VPA also reaps the benefits of a growing economy while having 
the potential to develop significant military capabilities. 
C. ANALYSIS 
As previously discussed in the Literature Review, Vietnam’s hedging strategy can 
be thought of as a policy to maintain more than one strategic option open against 
uncertainty and avoid over-reliance on any external power.164 With respect to military 
strengthening, hedging provides Vietnam the option to establish and maintain defense ties 
and procurement sources with more than one country. Even though over 80 percent of 
Vietnam’s military hardware is Russian, Hanoi’s fear of over-reliance on Russian 
equipment leads Vietnam to lessen its dependence on Moscow. For this reason, India has 
proven to be Vietnam’s most ideal defense partner due to familiar tactical and operational 
experience, and familiar Russian weapons compatibility and interoperability.165 
Meanwhile, despite Vietnam’s preference for Indian and Russian military hardware and 
training, Hanoi has expressed desire to purchase American-made weapons from the Japan 
and the United States in order to diversify its military hardware and seek compatibility with 
current weapons systems.166  
Perhaps the most commonly accepted belief that Vietnam’s overarching military 
modernization is a reaction to China’s aggression in the South China Sea; yet further 
analysis reveals that this may not be a one-sided view. This chapter has provided a different 
perspective, arguing that Vietnam’s reaction does not necessarily indicate a direct response 
to China’s or any adversary’s military power, but it may be a combination of China’s 
actions and Vietnam’s economic influence. Two main reasons provide support for this 
                                                 
164 Roy, “Southeast Asia and China: Balancing or Bandwagoning?,” 306; Goh, “Meeting the China 
Challenge: The U.S. In Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies,” 2. 
165 Thayer, “How India-Vietnam Strategic Ties Are Mutually Beneficial.” 
166 Minnick, “Vietnam May Request F-16s, P-3 Orions from U.S.”; Atsushi Tomiyama, “Vietnam Eyes 




argument. First, Vietnam’s strong economic growth, combined with the changing 
international environment, and the military’s involvement in economic development have 
all played a major role in motivating military modernization effort to counter threats and 
keep the South China Sea stable. Second, Vietnam’s military modernization goes in line 
with Jackson and Kuik’s definitions of hedging, explaining that military buildups are done 
to minimize risks without directly targeting at any power or adversary.167 If Vietnam’s 
military modernization represented a direct challenge to China, then Beijing may respond 
by increasing its militarization effort in the South China Sea, which would further cause an 
unstable environment off Vietnam’s shores. These two reasons are discussed more below. 
Firstly, data has shown that Vietnam’s strong economic growth facilitates a 
commensurate expansion of military spending in accordance with the National Defense 
White Paper, which stated the VPA’s intent to “invest in manufacturing weapons and 
equipment” and “procuring modern weapons and technological equipment” to meet the 
military’s requirements.168 Vietnam’s growing economy is also reflected in new 
partnerships and defense technology transfers with various countries. In addition, it has 
developed a stronger domestic defense industry, which is one of the main goals stated in 
the National Defense White Paper.169 Not only has Vietnam’s economic growth provided 
the opportunity to upgrade military capabilities, it also has expanded the VPA’s 
involvement in economic development to achieve Vietnam’s industrialized status by 
2020.170 Therefore, a prospering Vietnam requires a growing military to protect its freedom 
of navigation from traditional and nontraditional threats. 
Secondly, Vietnam is not the only country in Southeast Asia that has increased 
military spending. Compared to other member states within ASEAN, Vietnam’s total 
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military spending in 2016 ranks fourth behind Singapore, Indonesia, and Thailand.171 In 
addition, Vietnam’s military modernization, particularly its acquisition of submarines, may 
appear to be adhering to regional trends for a variety of strategic goals.172 Jackson further 
suggests that there might be some “intra-ASEAN military competition” among Southeast 
Asian states.173 Also, it seems unlikely that Vietnam’s military modernization effort is 
aimed at its Southeast Asian counterparts since most of them do not pose any immediate 
threat to Vietnam’s security.  
Nevertheless, it can be speculated that while China continues its aggressions in the 
South China Sea, Vietnam will pursue increased defense modernization. However, China’s 
influence on Vietnam’s military modernization should not be taken as the primary reason; 
but instead be understood as a complementary goal for Vietnam to achieve security, on top 
of Vietnam’s domestic agenda for industrialization. Overall, Vietnam’s cause for military 
modernization is for the security of its maritime territory, but also equally important is to 
meet Vietnam’s goal of a strong defense industry, enabled by strong economic 
performance. These two factors complement Vietnam’s goals of achieving a self-sustained 
military without heavily dependent on any other power. 
Finally, Vietnam’s overall defense modernization or indirect-balancing has shifted 
Hanoi toward a risk-contingency hedging option in Kuik’s Power Rejection/Acceptance 
Spectrum. States that seek the risk-contingency option tend to defy and reject the growing 
power and lean toward a balancing approach, yet they do not employ a total balancing 
strategy.174 Through military modernization, this chapter argues that Vietnam is 
maintaining its hedging strategy, although the indirect balancing component has been 
somewhat strengthened, especially after the 2014 oil rig crisis. Through indirect balancing 
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efforts via military modernization, this form of hedging strategy allows Vietnam to 
maintain a level of military readiness, while preserving friendly relations with China via 
trade, investments, and political support. On the other hand, if Vietnam were to employ a 
direct balancing strategy, in which its military modernization was firmly focused on 
forming alliances and upgrading capabilities against China, then Beijing would perceive it 
as provocative and most likely intensify its military activity in the region. Such an outcome 
would be counter-productive for Vietnam’s economy and military. 
In summary, this chapter described “what” Vietnam has done in its effort to 
modernize its military, then proceeded to identify the “why” factors that have caused 
Vietnam to increase its defense spending. The first section discussed Vietnam’s active 
involvement in procuring weapons from multiple partners instead of relying mainly on 
Russia’s weapons systems. It also discussed Vietnam’s goal to develop a homegrown 
defense industry. The second section provided two main reasons for Vietnam’s military 
modernization. The first reason points to China as the main factor; the second reason links 
to economic growth. Both reasons provide Vietnam with a contingency military option to 




III. VIETNAM’S ENMESHMENT STRATEGY 
This chapter discusses Vietnam’s hedging strategy through its dynamic foreign 
policies involving ASEAN and the major powers in the region, which have established 
strategic ties with Vietnam. This chapter focuses on Vietnam’s most common hedging 
behaviors, referred here as “enmeshment.” First, Vietnam’s enmeshment strategy typically 
displays “dominance-denial” behavior, which actively integrates major powers into an 
institutional arrangement to “minimize the political risks of subservience.”175 Second, at 
the bilateral and multilateral level, Vietnam exhibits “binding-engagement” behavior to 
maximize its “diplomatic benefits by engaging and binding big powers in various bilateral 
and multilateral institutions.”176 As a member of ASEAN, Vietnam is using its membership 
to transform major powers through constructivist or binding processes, causing them to 
either share ASEAN norms or constrain them through institutionalist mechanisms.177 This 
chapter is divided into three sections. The first section explores Vietnam’s bilateral policies 
through diversification with major powers in the wake of China’s growing influence. The 
second section then gives Vietnam’s proactive engagement in ASEAN since its accession 
in 1995. Finally, the concluding section applies Kuik’s Power Rejection/Acceptance 
Spectrum to Vietnam’s overall enmeshment strategy to support this study’s argument that 
Vietnam is hedging. 
A. VIETNAM’S BILATERAL DIPLOMACY 
In 1989, Hanoi had diplomatic relations with only 23 non-communist states; today, 
it has diplomatic footprints in almost all countries in the world.178 As Vietnam now 
acknowledges the benefits of international integration through diversification of its 
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diplomatic relationships, Hanoi has reaffirmed its decades-old policy of “cooperation and 
struggle,” denoting the concept of “cooperation” to win favorable situation and avoid 
conflict, but simultaneously “struggling” to protect Vietnam’s national and political 
interests.179 For example, Vietnam’s bid to gain full membership in the WTO allows it to 
“escape underdeveloped nation status” and be an “equal partner with other WTO 
members.”180 Vietnam’s focus on economic cooperation has been reinforced by its 
leadership rationale that it must escape “economic weakness, political isolation, and 
economic blockade” in order to protect the country’s “security and independence” and 
guard national interests.181 Similarly, in July 2003, when the Communist Party of Vietnam 
(CPV) adopted Resolution No. 8, On Defense of the Homeland in the New Situation, 
Vietnam acknowledged that it must allow itself to “cooperate” with opposing countries for 
mutual interests and “struggle” against friendly countries with political disagreements that 
may harm Vietnam’s national interests.182 
Beginning 2001, and increasing sharply since 2013, Vietnam has pursued strategic 
and comprehensive partnerships with multiple countries to achieve its goal of global 
integration.  By 2016, the list of partnerships had diversified and grown to twenty-five, 
including distant countries like Germany and Ukraine and neighboring countries such as 
Indonesia and the Philippines.183 Vietnam has two categories of partnerships that it holds 
with these countries: “strategic partnership” and “comprehensive partnership.” Strategic 
partnerships are then classified into three levels of agreements, including “comprehensive 
cooperative,” “extensive,” and “comprehensive.” While the intricacy of the different levels 
of partnerships are subjected to Vietnam’s foreign affairs definitions, the two categories of 
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partnerships and three levels of strategic partnerships are often used to signify the degree 
of cooperation and trust, as well as the extensiveness and complexity of Vietnam’s bilateral 
relations with these countries.184 In all, Vietnam refers to these partnerships as 
representative of its commitment to political, military, and security cooperation, but they 
do not constitute any military and security alliances.185 Among these types of partnerships, 
“comprehensive cooperative strategic partnership” holds the highest designation among all 
partnerships. Vietnam’s strategic relations with Japan, India, China, and the United States 
frequently get greater attention from international relations experts since these powers 
(excluding China) often share similar interests with Vietnam regarding security issues in 
the South China Sea. The next four sections will discuss Vietnam’s bilateral diplomacy 
with Japan, India, China, and the United States.  
1. Japan 
In 2006, Japan became the second country with which Vietnam signed a strategic 
partnership, following a similar agreement with Russia in 2001.186 Until recently, Vietnam-
Japan relations have been primarily geared toward economic factors that include 
investments and trade. Beginning in 2011, defense ties have increased to include military 
training, nontraditional security assistance, and expert-level exchanges in defense.187 Aside 
from developing a strong economic and defense relationship, Vietnam has allowed 
Japanese advisors, as the only foreign government representatives, to assist the government 
in developing and implementing Vietnam’s industrialization strategy become a “modern 
industrial country” by 2020.188 In addition, Japan was the first G7 country to recognize 
Vietnam as a “market economy.”189 Furthermore, Manyin argues that Vietnam’s deepening 
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relationship with Japan offers fewer “domestic constraints” or less “controversy” than 
relations with the United States or China, since Vietnamese have a favorable perception of 
Japan and Japanese leaders often do not express their opinion over Vietnam’s human rights 
record.190 For the Japanese government, greater relations with Vietnam will help increase 
its presence and integration in the area while improving its image as a partner nation to 
ASEAN.191  
For the Vietnamese government, Japan represents an important partner in which 
the Vietnamese leadership sees a convergence of interests on maritime issues, as both 
countries share maritime disputes with China in their respective regions. This convergence 
of interests allows Vietnam to benefit from Japanese support in challenging Beijing’s 
claims in the South China Sea. In 2014, the two countries upgraded their existing 
partnership to an extensive strategic partnership, which signified a broader intention to 
strengthen defense and maritime collaboration.192 Since then, Japan and Vietnam have 
enjoyed greater defense cooperation, which has included exchanges of military delegation 
and visits, maritime exercises, technology training, and good will port calls by the Japanese 
maritime forces.193 That same year, Japan began donating fishing vessels to Vietnam that 
will be converted into patrol boats for Vietnam’s coast guard and fisheries ministry.194 In 
addition, Japanese officials have pledged to supply Vietnam with six new boats worth $338 
million that will be used to increase Vietnam’s maritime patrol in the South China Sea.195 
Recently, Japanese newspapers have reported that Vietnam has raised the possibility of 
buying secondhand American P-3C antisubmarine patrol aircraft from Japan.196 These 
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indications suggest Vietnam’s rejection of China’s dominance in the region through 
cultivating defense and political support from Japan. Furthermore, as Japan sets out to 
increase its own military buildup and ensure its sea lines of communication remain open, 
it may seek to promote a coalition with the United States and other South China Sea 
claimants to maintain the balance of power in the region. Thus, Vietnam may receive 
political benefit from this coalition and avoid the risk of subservience to China’s hegemon. 
2. India 
India is among Vietnam’s most important defense partners in the region, not only 
because India was Vietnam’s “most trusted friend and ally” during the Cold War, but 
because they do not share common borders and no major historical controversies exist 
between the two countries.197 In 2007, India became Vietnam’s third strategic partner when 
both countries signed a strategic partnership to expand bilateral ties and defense 
cooperation.198 A partnership with Vietnam could support India’s “Act East” policy as it 
aims to play a major role in securing regional maritime peace in the Indian Ocean and in 
the South China Sea.199 Palit speculates that India will continue to increase its commitment 
to the region, given the economic importance of the country’s trade and investments in East 
and Southeast Asia.200 In addition, India and China have long been contesting territorial 
claims along their 1,400-mile border. Most recently, in July 2017, the two powers almost 
came to a major battle over a disputed territory.201   
For the Vietnamese leadership, the growing ties between India and Vietnam 
complement each state’s strategic interests. These ties demonstrate India’s resolve to assert 
its influence and power beyond its borders, while also revealing Vietnam’s cultivation of 
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power balance in the region. As such, Vietnam’s dominance-denial hedging behavior 
provides evidence that India can act as an emerging power to challenge China in its 
periphery, especially in the South China Sea. Hanoi perceives that Indian political and 
naval presence in the South China Sea may give Vietnam the military and political support 
it needs to deny and reject China’s dominance in the region. In January 2018, India, in its 
bid to counterbalance China’s ambitions in Southeast Asia, hosted all ten ASEAN heads 
of state to discuss trade and maritime security issues.202 The summit also saw India inked 
a major energy investment deal with Vietnam to expand its interests in the region.203 Not 
only has India been an avid supporter of Vietnam in a wide range of economic and defense 
sectors, India has also provided training and held naval exercises with Vietnam.204 In 
addition, India is one of the major powers in the region that has considerable experience in 
using Soviet-produced weaponry, which may have contributed to the growing defense 
exchanges and naval exercises between the two countries.205  
Since 2014, both countries broadened their strategic partnership, including 
“expanded joint exercises, training programs, defense equipment cooperation... and port 
visits.”206 India has also expressed strong commitment to modernize Vietnam’s military 
and has placed great importance in its defense relations with Vietnam.207 These 
developments in their strategic partnership were aimed at stronger bilateral cooperation in 
national defense. Brewster, however, argues that while Vietnam wants to “develop India 
as political and economic balance to China, India is yet to prove itself as a credible a 
security partner to Vietnam… since India’s power projection capabilities are limited and 
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has not demonstrated commitment to the security relationship.”208 Because of this, Vietnam 
must continue to seek and establish broader strategic relationships with more countries than 
just India. 
3. China 
In 2008, China became Vietnam’s fourth strategic partner, seventeen years after 
both countries normalized relations.209 Despite their border and maritime disputes, in 2013, 
Vietnam and China agreed on a historic “comprehensive cooperative strategic partnership,” 
the “only and highest designation among all of Vietnam’s strategic partners.”210 As 
strategic partners, Vietnam and China have developed ties to manage their military 
relations through multiple exchange and defense cooperation programs at various 
ministerial levels.211 One crucial element of Vietnam’s defense cooperation unique to 
China is the annual joint-Border Defense Friendship Exchange program, initiated in March 
2014. The program involves respective defense ministers to oversee exchanges in 
personnel training, border cooperation, counter-terrorism exercises, research, and defense 
industry.212 In addition, Vietnam and China have been increasing their joint border patrols 
as well as hosting defense policy dialogues at multiple ministerial and defense levels.  
As both countries share similar governing ideology, Hanoi and Beijing approach 
some global and domestic issues the same way, especially when it comes to distributing 
information and controlling domestic disturbances. Additionally, Hanoi sees China as an 
economic and political model to follow, in which China as opened up its economy without 
giving up the party’s political dominance, while warding off Western ideas that are 
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considered threats to the regime.213 However, there are certainly differences in both 
countries’ security and economic interests that could turn the relationship sour. The 2014 
oil-rig crisis was an example that undermined bilateral relations and further cultivated 
Vietnam’s mistrust of Chinese intention in the South China Sea.214    After a series of visits 
and diplomatic talks, Vietnam and China mended relations and agreed to establish an 
emergency defense hotline between the two military to manage tensions at sea.215  
Vietnam’s routine pattern of cooperation and struggle when dealing with a powerful 
and aggressive China suggests a limited-bandwagoning behavior. Hanoi’s limited-
bandwagoning policy is demonstrated by Hanoi’s unique relationship with Beijing through 
deferring and forging the highest strategic partnership with Beijing in order to collaborate 
on sensitive issues. This policy also aims to create closer solidarity with Beijing and 
channels of communication to ease maritime confrontations. Despite the Sino-Vietnamese 
solidarity, however, public opinion vis-à-vis China has become “toxic” in the wake of 
recent Chinese assertions in the South China Sea in that it poses a challenge to Vietnamese 
leadership legitimacy and power.216   
4. The United States 
The relationship between Vietnam and the United States on defense cooperation 
can be described as slow and cautious since both countries normalized relations in 1995. 
In 2003, the United States made its first naval visit to Vietnam since the end of the Vietnam 
War.217 Subsequent U.S. naval visits to Vietnam boosted relations and helped solidify U.S.-
Vietnam defense ties. Military relations between both countries received significant boosts 
during the Obama administration under the pivot to Asia strategy. In addition, to many of 
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Vietnamese leadership in Hanoi, the increase of American influence in the region is 
perceived as a counter-balance to an increasingly aggressive China. In 2011, the countries 
signed a MOU to advance bilateral defense cooperation in five areas: maritime security, 
search and rescue, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, exchanges between defense 
universities and research institutes, and U.N. peacekeeping operations.218  
A major turning point in U.S.-Vietnam relations came in 2013 when the two sides 
signed a comprehensive partnership that further increased bilateral cooperation.219 Thayer 
argues that Vietnam chose this comprehensive partnership, rather than a strategic 
partnership with the United States because it satisfied the mutual interest of both 
countries.220 The comprehensive partnership currently allows Vietnam to “cooperate” with 
the United States when their interests converge and “struggle” when the United States 
challenges Vietnam’s political interests, such as one-party rule and human rights.221 Also 
in 2013, the U.S. State Department announced that it would provide five patrol vessels to 
the Vietnamese Coast Guard. Since then, defense cooperation and relations have continued 
to improve with the full lifting on the sale of lethal weapons to Vietnam in 2016.222 In an 
interview with Sr. Lt. Gen. Nguyen Chi Vinh, Vietnam’s Deputy Minister of National 
Defense, he emphasized that “the removal of the embargo is not just significant in terms 
of trade, but also in terms of improving high-level trust and confidence.”223 Additionally, 
in a joint statement between Vietnamese President Tran Dai Quang and President Obama, 
both leaders reaffirmed their “continued pursuit of a deepened relationship on the basis of 
respect for each other’s political system, independence, sovereignty, and territorial 
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integrity.”224 This statement could be seen as a signal that the two countries might have 
moved past their political differences to highlight the convergence of their security 
interests.225 This overall increase in defense cooperation with the United States implies the 
degree of Vietnam’s dominance-denial behavior as it seeks to deepen security cooperation 
with the United States to maintain the balance of power in the region.  
From the United States’ perspective, despite past U.S. criticism of Hanoi’s poor 
human-rights record, Washington’s deepening defense ties with Hanoi means that it may 
have found another partner in Southeast Asia to deny China’s growing influence in the 
region. Vietnam’s dominance-denial policy may also be helpful to the United States’ 
strategic view because the Philippines has appeared to yield to China’s rise in recent 
years.226 Defense ties between the United States and Vietnam greatly increased under the 
Obama administration. In 2016, the United States, under the Maritime Security Initiative, 
provided $20 million to Vietnam to purchase maritime defense equipment that would be 
used in assisting Vietnam’s maritime enforcement agencies and encouraging military 
technology interoperability with other regional forces.227 However, trade relations between 
the two countries have come under scrutiny under the Trump administration. In addition, 
Hanoi was disappointed when Washington pulled out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) negotiations to focus on reducing overall trade deficits; Vietnam had $32 billion 
surplus with the United States in 2016 alone.228 Nevertheless, in a first sign of military 
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cooperation between the Trump administration and Vietnam, the United States delivered 
six small vessels to the Vietnamese coast guard in May 2017.229  
In summary, the shared perception of China’s growing military and economic 
influence has banded together Vietnam and other regional powers to engage China through 
strengthening partnerships. In particular, Vietnam stands as a beneficiary of greater 
cooperation among great powers, as well as the receiver in security and economic 
assistance. Although the Vietnamese leadership reserves the role of the most important 
strategic partner for China for ideological and geopolitical reasons, Hanoi also realizes that 
anti-China sentiments and overreliance on Beijing is a sensitive issue among the 
population. Consequently, Hanoi continues to diversify its diplomatic relations and seek 
comprehensive and strategic partnerships with an increased focus on defense cooperation, 
which seems to suggest that the purpose is to constrain or balance against China, not just 
to enmesh regional powers like Japan, India, and the United States. Thus, briefly, since late 
2011, Vietnam’s increasing number of strategic and comprehensive partnerships has 
demonstrated a strong degree of dominance-denial behavior, according to Kuik’s hedging 
spectrum. The rapid increase in number and value of its dominance-denial actions, most 
notably with Japan, India, and the United States, indicates that Vietnam is moving toward 
the balancing end of the hedging spectrum.  
B. VIETNAM’S MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY 
Vietnam’s more liberal view on multilateral diplomacy did not fully materialize 
until the early 1990s when the doi moi era had started. Much of Vietnam’s early multilateral 
diplomacy experience before doi moi was gained as a member of the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (CMEA) led by the Soviet Union that included various communist 
states in the world.230 However, beginning in the mid-1990s, Vietnam’s international 
integration included its membership in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 
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1998, the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2007, and over the last few years, a full 
participant in the negotiations of the TPP agreement. These recent, major milestones in 
Hanoi’s multilateral diplomacy and international integration reveal a “strategic 
transformation” of Hanoi’s leadership thinking from political isolation and economic 
weaknesses to a policy of economic development with emphasis on multilateral 
cooperation.231 As a result, this strategic transformation thinking has helped Vietnam 
diversify and solidify some of its diplomatic, economic, and defense relations with regional 
and international institutions. Vietnam’s economic diversification also puts it on Kuik’s 
hedging spectrum, where Hanoi tries to minimize the risk of economic dependence on 
China. This is most demonstrated by Vietnam’s full pledge to be part of the TPP, an 
economic trade agreement that encompasses most of the Pacific Rim nations, but not 
including China. 
During the last National Party Congress in 2016, Vietnamese leadership reiterated 
the importance having a proactive foreign policy and international integration, that 
Vietnam must be “a friend, reliable partner, and a responsible member of the international 
community.”232 Perhaps one of the major highlights of Vietnam’s regional integration has 
been its admission into ASEAN and ASEAN-centered institutions, both basing their 
collaboration on the framework of non-intervention and unanimity. The following sections 
will outline evidence that shows Vietnam’s “binding engagement” with ASEAN to 
transform or constrain China through institutionalist mechanisms. 
1. Transforming and Constraining China through Enmeshment 
In July 1995, when Vietnam became a full member of ASEAN, it marked the first 
time that Vietnam had “join[ed] a regional grouping of countries that have different 
sociopolitical systems and ideologies.”233 Most scholars agree that the driving force behind 
Vietnam’s membership in ASEAN was Hanoi’s opening of its economy, attracting foreign 
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direct investment (FDI), and the normalizing of relations with countries in the region.234 
However, it can be argued that the primary factor that motivated Hanoi to seek membership 
was its awareness that Vietnam must pursue stability, recognition, and acceptance in the 
regional and international community, and importantly, domestic reforms with strong 
emphasis on economic growth after over two decades of military conflict. In this respect, 
Koh contends that Vietnam regards “ASEAN as the centerpiece of its foreign policies to 
ensure national survival and prosperity.”235 Furthermore, analysts had speculated that 
Vietnam’s membership in ASEAN would prove useful for addressing its security dilemma 
relating to China and the South China Sea.236 Likewise, Emmers argues that as a member 
of ASEAN, Vietnam would find itself in a stronger diplomatic position and security 
cooperation in the region.237 
In the years since China expanded its military control of the South China Sea, which 
includes the seizure of the Mischief Reef from the Philippines in 1995, ASEAN has 
identified China as the region’s “top security threat.”238 More recently, however, ASEAN 
began focusing on conflict avoidance and establishing a “conflict management 
mechanism” to encourage all its members and China to deescalate conflicts.239 From 
Hanoi’s view, membership in ASEAN would internationalize its territorial dispute with 
Beijing in the South China Sea, and could possibly constrain Beijing’s actions towards 
Vietnamese claims.240 That is, Vietnam anticipates that it could alter its maritime disputes 
with China into a multilateral discussion between ASEAN and China, rather than dealing 
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with China all by itself. As with the “ASEAN way,” Southeast Asian states wanted to reach 
a consensus before holding talks with China. By utilizing pragmatic conflict management 
mechanisms and ASEAN’s inter-regional relations, the institution is able engage China 
through multilateral, rather than bilateral negotiations, as China once insisted the 1990s.241 
Even so, China and ASEAN could not reach an agreement on the Code of Conduct (COC) 
for the South China Sea; so in November 2002, ASEAN foreign ministers and China’s vice 
foreign minister agreed on a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties (DOC) in the South 
China Sea.242 The purpose of the agreement was to prevent further tensions and reduce the 
risks of military conflict between China and ASEAN members. The DOC also called on 
all involved parties to resolve their disputes peacefully and pledged to practice self-
restraint.  
As a member of ASEAN, Vietnam has been provided with some diplomatic 
leverage when dealing with non-member states. Since its admission to ASEAN in 1995, 
Vietnam has been active, advocating for the institution’s greater role in managing regional 
disputes and supporting the association’s way of cooperation and unanimity. Not only does 
Vietnam appreciate the possibility of ASEAN transforming China through constructivist 
processes to partake in ASEAN norms, Vietnam also promotes the inclusion of regional 
powers into the ASEAN community. In 2010, ASEAN, under Vietnam’s chairmanship, 
inaugurated the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) including eight 
non-ASEAN countries: Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Russian Federation, 
South Korea, and the United States. One of the main goals of the ADMM-Plus is to enhance 
non-security areas, such as the regional humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) 
and promote confidence-building between ASEAN and partner nations. The ADMM-Plus 
has also fostered deeper cooperation and enabled defense and security discussions under a 
common platform that may potentially solve certain issues in the South China Sea. Through 
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Vietnam’s active multilateral binding-engagement, Hanoi can use the ADMM-Plus to 
facilitate and internationalize the security issues in the South China Sea. More recently, 
Vietnam’s has used this forum to voice its security concerns in the South China Sea without 
damaging its relations with Beijing, yet also providing ASEAN the mechanism to further 
integrate and transform major powers into the institutional norms.  
The Shangri-La Dialogue is among the most talked about defense and regional 
security discussions in Southeast Asia is, organized annually by the International Institute 
for Strategic Studies (IISS), a London-based think tank. Although not a means of 
enmeshing China, Vietnamese officials have been invited to attend the dialogue to voice 
Hanoi’s security challenges to members of the forum, which include the ASEAN states, 
Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, and is attended by most senior Western officials. The 
discussion has seen Vietnam and ASEAN states suggesting measures to strengthen 
cooperation with the United States for regional peace and security, as well as requesting 
China to speed up the negotiation of COC for the South China Sea.243 Some of these 
discussions have been focusing on security cooperation in the region and calling out China 
for disregarding other nations’ interests and international law, and thereby, hope that it 
would become a more responsible international leader. Recently, however, China has been 
downgrading its participation in the Shangri-La Dialogue due to its tendency to avoid 
discussing contentious issues in any multilateral settings.244  
In recent years, Vietnam, as well as ASEAN as a whole, has continually responded 
to maritime disputes by raising the issues at international arbitration and regional forums, 
such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the East Asia Summit (EAS), to find a 
common solution in accordance with international law.245 Scholars have noted that the 
ARF, since its creation in 1993, has increased security cooperation between ASEAN and 
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non-ASEAN states, as well as addressed strategic uncertainty by “entangling, enmeshing, 
or engaging” China through norms-based interactions and socialization to foster trust and 
mutual security.246 Others have pointed out the fact that ASEAN has contributed to the 
stabilizing of Southeast Asia concerning power rivalries between the United States, China, 
Japan and India; and without the institution, Southeast Asian states would be more 
susceptible to world and regional powers’ influence.247 Such strategic policy has provided 
proof that ASEAN members’ use of the AFR has been to actively deny China’s hegemonic 
dominance in the region, and thus, minimize the political risks of subservience.248 For 
Vietnam, the ARF had provided hope and motivation that ASEAN could shape Chinese 
behavior and align it with regional norms in accordance with the “ASEAN way.” However, 
recent disunity in ASEAN has diminished that hope. Nevertheless, Vietnam has reportedly 
been accelerating its engagement with ASEAN and calling for greater unity to challenge 
China’s territorial claims, especially after China rejected the United Nations Arbitral 
Tribunal decision in July 2016.249 Thus, through constructivist process and institutionalist 
mechanisms, Vietnam’s enmeshment strategy to transform China through ASEAN may be 
limited. The next section discusses some of the limits to Vietnam’s strategy.  
2. Limitations in Enmeshing China through ASEAN 
As a 10-nation regional institution, ASEAN’s distinguished political style is known 
for its informal approach, with characteristics of conflict prevention, non-interfering in 
another member’s domestic agenda, and a reliance on consensus-driven decision-making 
process. Vietnam has certainly enjoyed the economic and political benefits of this 
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multilateral process; however, ASEAN has also presented some disappointment to Hanoi 
in the context of ASEAN-China negotiations with regard to the South China Sea. 
Additionally, while the 2002 DOC was sometimes seen as an ASEAN diplomatic victory 
in enmeshing China to co-exist with the rest of the maritime Southeast Asian states, 
Vietnam was disappointed that ASEAN did not jointly issue a binding COC. Therefore, 
China’s enmeshment strategy does not guarantee that there will not be new incidents 
involving Chinese and Vietnamese vessels at sea.250  
In 2012, Cambodia, acting as ASEAN Chair, together with ASEAN members, 
failed to issue a joint communique on the South China Sea disputes in a closing statement. 
Cambodia’s action, departing from ASEAN’s pattern of consensus, was due to its close 
relationship with China and appeasement policy toward Beijing.251 Scholars have pointed 
to a few reasons behind this lack of cohesion. Since the early 2000s, as Beijing aimed at 
fostering relations, China’s soft power and charm offensive in Southeast Asia had 
encouraged economic and cultural development and established strong relations with 
ASEAN.252 Additionally, non-claimant states in the South China Sea, such as Cambodia, 
Laos, and Thailand did not worry about China’s maritime expansion and territorial claims 
and therefore, were not likely to challenge Beijing for fear of political and economic 
reprisal. And finally, ASEAN’s strict principle of consensus-based decision-making has 
made it less effective in solving traditional disputes other than to issue non-binding 
statements, which may undermine the institution’s relevance and weakens its capacity to 
act on behalf of its members.253 This overall lack of cooperation within ASEAN further 
exacerbated the challenge for ASEAN to maintain its principles of consensus, centrality, 
and unity.254  
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Among the foremost founding philosophies of ASEAN is its principle of non-
interference from major powers in the region. However, the increasing competition 
between the United States and China in Southeast Asia may have compromised such 
founding principles. Scholars have pointed to two possible new challenges that have 
surfaced since ASEAN’s responses to these disputes. First, ASEAN might possibly 
become fractured by strong division among its member states due to their individual 
preference and prioritization in managing relations with China and the United States255 
Second, if ASEAN were to fail in resolving the South China Sea security issue, it could 
result in a less effective institution. Such an outcome would encourage claimant states to 
seek consultation outside ASEAN to resolve the issue and weaken any ASEAN-led 
regional forums.256  
At the 2017 ASEAN summit in the Philippines, ASEAN, in its closing statement, 
again called on both China and its members to endorse a binding COC for the South China 
Sea; however, critics argue that the statement fell short of a united ASEAN statement 
against China. In addition, Beijing, on multiple occasions, has stated its preference for a 
voluntary or non-binding COC, which further delays the negotiation progress.257 
Furthermore, as China ramps up its economic investments and trade deals across Southeast 
Asia, there have been signs of ASEAN states leaning toward China. Chief among them is 
President Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines, who has pivoted toward China, and is causing 
a rift in relations with the United States, in exchange for stronger economic cooperation 
with China.258 Overall, the combined ASEAN limitations, challenges, combined with 
China’s growing economic might and influence have thus far prevented Vietnam from 
enmeshing China into regional norms, or finding real multilateral solutions to its South 
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China Sea problems. For these reasons, Hanoi seems to be running out of time and options 
in employing ASEAN as diplomatic and security leverage against China. 
C. ANALYSIS 
Although Vietnam now faces a far more powerful China than ever before, the 
Vietnamese leadership knows it must not only modernize its weaponry, but also reach out 
to multiple partners for security and political support. This chapter presented two types of 
evidence that brought out the shift in Vietnam’s foreign policy toward dominance-denial. 
The first dealt with Vietnam’s bilateral relations with major powers. The second dealt with 
its efforts to enhance its engagement with ASEAN. By this outreach, Vietnam hopes to 
bind China into regional and international environments with the long-term goal gradually 
transforming Chinese norms. 
The first evidence dealt with Vietnam’s efforts to develop closer bilateral relations 
with influential countries. Through its multiple strategic and defense partnerships, Hanoi 
is seen as promoting defense and diplomatic equilibrium in the region, while also 
preserving its national sovereignty and security. By establishing multiple strategic 
partnerships with Japan, India, and the United States, which have similar security interests 
in the region, Hanoi exercises its hedging behavior to minimize the risk of subservience to 
Beijing’s demands and aggression. Thus, dominance-denial strategy reflects a balancing 
behavior that serves as a countervailing force to limit China’s influence. 
On the other hand, Vietnam has given its partnership with China the “highest 
designation among all of Vietnam’s strategic partners.”259 This type of preferential 
treatment for Beijing suggests that Vietnam exercises limited-bandwagoning policy. 
Vietnam’s “three no” policy exists partially to allay China’s fear of encirclement and 
accommodate China’s security interests.260 However, Vietnam’s balance of power in the 
region and its rapid increase in the number of strategic partnerships in recent years suggest 
that Hanoi has moved toward balancing end of the spectrum. Additionally, these strategic 
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partnerships also reinforce Hanoi’s military modernization efforts, as explained in the 
previous chapter. Therefore, these behaviors suggest that Hanoi is exhibiting strong 
dominance-denial behavior and is shifting toward the balancing end of the spectrum. 
The second evidence dealt with Vietnam’s multilateral diplomacy, primarily 
through binding engagement with ASEAN. One of Vietnam’s goals in joining ASEAN was 
to enmesh China to conform to the institution. This type of hedging has provided Hanoi 
diplomats with additional leverage in negotiating disputes in the South China Sea and 
increasing its voice at regional defense forums without antagonizing Beijing too much. 
Undoubtedly, joining ASEAN has provided Vietnam with broader economic and defense 
cooperation, as well as growth. After years of negotiations, Hanoi, together with other 
ASEAN members, has succeeded in internationalizing the maritime disputes over the 
South China Sea with Beijing. However, this chapter argues that ASEAN has yet to 
guarantee Vietnam the traditional security it needs to defend against China’s behavior in 
the South China Sea. This is due to a variety of reasons, including the strong influence and 
soft power exerted by Beijing, ASEAN’s firm principles of non-interference and consensus 
that requires all members to agree on an issue, and the differing interests of each ASEAN 
member. As a result, Vietnam, through ASEAN, is unable to “bind” China to conform to 
regional norms. From this perspective, one can argue that ASEAN has lost its political 
weight and may bandwagon with China, which would contradict Vietnam’s determination 
to resolve its conflicts with China through ASEAN.261 In that case, in its attempt to enmesh 
China through ASEAN, Hanoi’s binding engagement policy could trap Vietnam in the 
ASEAN-China dialogue that may bind Hanoi to conform to the “ASEAN Way,” and 
together with ASEAN, bandwagon with China.  
While ASEAN’s failure in its joint communique against Beijing has disappointed 
Vietnam, Hanoi has been significantly boosting its own economic diversification and 
security cooperation through bilateral and multilateral dialogues with overwhelming 
dominance-denial policies. Therefore, by visualizing Kuik’s Power Rejection/Acceptance 
Spectrum, this chapter concludes that Vietnam is maintaining its hedging strategy, but in 
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the last several years, it has used dominance-denial, economic diversification, and binding 
engagement behaviors more extensively in favor of balancing against China than those 
options at the bandwagoning end of the spectrum.  
Overall, Vietnam’s two-pronged foreign policy approach, involving bilateral 
relations with major powers and multilateral engagement with ASEAN, offers mutually 
counteracting hedging behaviors in Kuik’s Power Rejection/Acceptance Spectrum. In 
other words, Vietnam’s “dominance denial” behavior has given Hanoi the means to 
cultivate the balance of major powers to minimize political and security risks, while its 
“binding engagement” behavior has provided Vietnam the instruments to maximize 
diplomatic benefits, engaging and binding Beijing bilaterally and multilaterally. 
“Dominance denial” behavior falls within the risk-contingency option, which tends to defy 
and reject the growing power and lean toward a balancing approach; however, “binding 
engagement” behavior fits within the returns-maximizing option, which leans toward a 
bandwagoning approach and a degree of power acceptance in order to gain economic and 
diplomatic benefits without incurring unnecessary risks.262  
In summary, this chapter explains Vietnam’s approach to its bilateral and 
multilateral relationships as strategic leverage in its diplomatic negotiations: first, by 
constraining Beijing through institutionalist and bilateral mechanisms; and second, by 
transforming Beijing’s behaviors through ASEAN processes and norms. The first section 
discusses Vietnam’s bilateral policies with major powers in the wake of China’s growing 
influence in Southeast Asia. It also discusses the strategic and comprehensive partnership 
agreements that Vietnam established, most notably with Japan, India, China, and the 
United States. The second section provides Vietnam’s multilateral diplomacy experience 
with ASEAN since becoming a member of the regional institution. Finally, this chapter 
concludes that Vietnam is maintaining a subtle form of limited-bandwagoning strategy. 
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This thesis describes Vietnam’s policy over the last few years in response to 
China’s rising power and identifies the reasons for Vietnam’s changing behavior towards 
its northern neighbor. Hanoi’s approach to foreign policy since the beginning of doi moi in 
the late 1980s has been described as diversification and has led the country to participate 
in most regional and internationalization organizations. Doi moi also changed the 
Vietnamese leadership’s thoughts about international relations and their perception of 
national security, which led to the adoption of a hedging policy toward great powers. 
China’s increasing aggression in the last few years, however, has pressured Vietnam to 
balance against China as opposed to continue hedging. As Chapter II revealed, Vietnam’s 
recent response to the escalation of disputes with China and China’s militarization in the 
South China Sea was to increase its acquisition of military hardware and develop its 
domestic defense industry. Another important, but complementary, reason for Vietnam’s 
military modernization can also be attributed to the success of doi moi economic 
renovations. Chapter III discussed Vietnam’s hedging strategy through dominance-denial 
and binding-engagement behaviors. Through these behaviors, Vietnam established 
strategic partnerships with multiple powers and membership in ASEAN and ASEAN-
related institutions, such as the ARF and EAS. This concluding chapter assesses the causes 
of Vietnam’s policy choices as presented in the preceding chapters to determine whether 
they are similar to or different from Vietnam’s hedging policy in the 1990s and analyzes 
whether Vietnam may be moving toward new behavior, by using Kuik’s Power 
Rejection/Acceptance Spectrum.  
A. ADDRESSING HYPOTHESIS AND RESEARCH PURPOSE 
At the introduction of this thesis, it was hypothesized that Vietnam is still pursuing 
a policy of hedging against China. Like many Southeast Asian countries, Vietnam’s 
uncertainty about the power structure and rivalry that will exist in the region between the 
United States and China is pushing Hanoi toward adopting a hedging strategy. This 
hedging strategy, a non-taking-side approach and keeping its own position, offers Hanoi 
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the flexibility to deal with China’s increasing assertiveness. In addressing the research 
question and determining to what degree Vietnam’s policy toward China has changed, both 
Chapters II and III provided analyses for Vietnam’s hedging behaviors which validates the 
hypothesis. While Vietnam is still pursuing a subtle form of hedging strategy, through 
military modernization, multiple strategic partnerships, and various forms of dominance-
denial policies, Vietnam is strengthening its balancing component to defy and reject 
China’s growing power. 
As presented in Chapters II and III, it is clear that Vietnam’s hedging strategy has 
begun to shift from the center of Kuik’s spectrum toward the balancing end of that 
spectrum. Most scholars agree that Vietnam is hedging, and a growing number come to the 
same conclusion as this thesis, that Vietnam is moving toward balancing. Kuik concludes 
that Vietnam is one of the few ASEAN countries that have openly supported America’s 
“rebalancing” effort to the region while also balancing China militarily through 
modernization and security cooperation.263 Le concludes that Vietnam has shifted its 
hedging strategy toward balancing.264 For defensive purposes, Le argues that Vietnam will 
continue to forge closer security and defense ties with major powers outside of Southeast 
Asia, but will stop short of entering into formal alliances with them.265 Tran and Sato also 
come to a similar conclusion, offering that Vietnam will continue its hedging strategy 
regardless of China’s growing power.266 Moreover, Tran suggests that Hanoi will likely 
continue to enhance strategic partnerships and cooperation with multiple powers in 
economic and defense.267 This thesis concurs with all four scholars’ conclusions as 
presented in the preceding chapters, now summarized for brevity.  
Chapter II concluded that Vietnam’s strong economic growth plays an important 
role in motivating Vietnam in its defense modernization effort to counter traditional threats 
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and minimize potential risks posed by China in the South China Sea. Chapter II also 
provides clear evidence of “internal balancing.” Economic growth and the increasing 
Chinese threat, together fuel Vietnam’s goal of achieving a self-sustained military without 
heavy dependence on any one power or supplier of weapons; thus, Hanoi is cautiously 
expressing its opposition toward Beijing’s militarization of the South China Sea. It can be 
speculated that while China continues its aggressions in the South China Sea, Vietnam will 
pursue increased defense modernization through internal balancing. Through Vietnam’s 
modernization effort, Chapter II concluded that Vietnam has chosen the “risk-contingency” 
option to oppose and reject China’s power. Such strategic option tends to lean toward a 
balancing approach, yet they do not fully employ a total balancing strategy.268 Through this 
definition, Vietnam is seen as fulfilling its defense strategy by military means.  
Chapter III demonstrated that Vietnam’s policies are largely consistent with 
evidence of dominance denial that minimizes Vietnam’s political and diplomatic risks in 
the balance of power in the region. Chapter III concluded with evidence that Vietnam’s 
hedging behaviors has tilted closer to the balancing end of Kuik’s hedging spectrum. It is 
noteworthy that Vietnam’s increasing number of strategic partnerships also coincides with 
the period of increased tensions in the South China Sea. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
conclude that Vietnam’s policy is changing in response to those tensions. However, two 
factors may limit Vietnam’s shift toward balancing.  
First, on the multilateral front, the Vietnam-ASEAN enmeshment strategy 
regarding the South China Sea no longer works for Vietnam as it once did, as evident by 
the limitations of the “ASEAN Way” principles. This has led to the conclusion that China 
seems to have achieved diplomatic victory in its bilateral relations with some individual 
ASEAN countries. With an ASEAN decision-making body based on consensus, it is not 
difficult for China to divide ASEAN, since all it takes is one member-state to disagree on 
an issue to make ASEAN “break.” Therefore, ASEAN, when divided, is weak. Moreover, 
China’s “charm offensive” towards countries like Cambodia and Laos, and the potential 
billions of dollars in trade and infrastructure investments to the Philippines, has weakened 
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ASEAN’s unity and their resolve to curb China’s influence and aggression. From an 
institutionalist mechanism standpoint, this thesis also argues that ASEAN has lost its 
political weight, and could therefore, bandwagon with China. Thus, Hanoi’s bid to 
transform Beijing through binding processes to share ASEAN norms or to constrain 
Beijing through institutionalist mechanisms may have already failed, leading it to 
selectively yield and defer to China on certain political and economic issues. 
Second, the uncertainty in the balance of power in the region and competition for 
influence between China and the United States not only further complicates the overall 
security environment in Southeast Asia, but also Vietnam’s future hedging strategy. 
Moreover, despite recent emphasis on U.S. rebalancing strategy toward the Asia-Pacific 
region, some scholars argue that U.S. strategy is aimed at actively engaging and denying 
China’s rise through helping China’s neighbors, rather than containing it in the South China 
Sea.269 Furthermore, lingering Vietnamese distrust of U.S. intentions prevent any 
conservative policy makers in Vietnam from reaching out to the United States for support. 
Besides, Vietnamese leadership has prioritized maintaining a stable relationship with 
Beijing, manifest by the greater cooperation and solidarity between the two countries and 
Vietnam’s view of China as the most important strategic partner. 
The Sino-Vietnamese solidarity has prompted scholars like Vuving to argue that 
Vietnam’s hedging approach has “increasingly proved ineffective.”270 Vuving reasons that 
Hanoi’s act of deference to Beijing has been shown through multiple high delegation visits 
by Vietnamese officials to China, even in the wake of the oilrig crisis in 2014.271 
Additionally, Vuving contends that although Vietnam perceives China as an age-old 
adversary, the CPV prefers to maintain the Sino-Vietnamese communist camaraderie 
above national security issues—suggesting that Hanoi favors deference and limited-
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bandwagoning in exchange for a peaceful environment.272 Vuving also claims that 
Vietnam’s acceptance of its “subordinate position to China in a hierarchy of states” and 
hope of “ideological bonds between the two communist parties” will serve to defuse the 
South China Sea conflict.273 However, as previously stated, while CPV’s solidarity with 
Beijing reflects a certain bandwagoning approach, the CPV regime is more concerned with 
legitimacy to maintain its power, which generally rests with popular support. Thus, the 
CPV recognizes that any closer cooperation with Beijing will likely upset its population, 
and that anti-China nationalism intensified by maritime disputes with China will also pose 
greater challenge to Vietnamese leadership legitimacy and power. The likely case is that, 
as this thesis has shown, the CPV will continue to be responsive to the changing 
international and domestic environment by finding the right balance between 
bandwagoning and balancing strategies vis-à-vis China.  
B. ASSESSING VIETNAM’S INCLINATION 
The inherent nature of a hedging strategy is the avoidance of over-reliance on an 
external power in an uncertain environment. Hedging strategy may seem “contradictory,” 
but they serve as an assurance when relations turn sour, while at the same time, reaping the 
benefits when relations are good.274 Chapters II and III revealed that Vietnam pursues 
ambiguous policies vis-à-vis competing powers, mainly the United States and China, to 
prepare for any changing conditions. The evidence presented in the preceding chapters 
shows that Vietnam’s behavior matches the policy elements that Kuik described as 
hedging. First, Vietnam’s “three no” policy exists on the principle of non-alignment.275 
Second, as revealed in Chapters II and III, Vietnam adopts both opposite and mutually 
counteracting hedging behaviors, including indirect-balancing behavior and dominance 
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denial, while also employing binding engagement and limited-bandwagoning with China. 
And third, Vietnam’s returns-maximizing options (binding engagement and limited-
bandwagoning behaviors) focused mostly on exploiting the economic, diplomatic, and 
political benefits with China when the relationship is at its best; simultaneously, the risk-
contingency options (indirect-balancing behavior and dominance denial behaviors) are 
adopted to mitigate risks in case the relationship with China goes awry. Eventually, these 
combined contradictory options or behaviors function as a strategy of avoiding taking sides 
with or against any power, thereby “avoiding the danger of putting all-the-eggs-in-one-
basket while keeping a fallback position for as long as the power structure at the systemic 
level remains uncertain.”276 
In conclusion, this thesis argues that, based on Kuik’s hedging spectrum and the 
elements of hedging, Vietnam is, in fact, hedging, but the side to which Hanoi is tilting has 
gone to the balancing end of the spectrum. Given the nature of Vietnam’s opaque and often 
secretive political system, it is difficult to know the real motives behind Vietnam’s hedging 
strategy. As the U.S.-China rivalry intensifies, Vietnam’s efforts to avoid choosing 
between the two great powers will only get more difficult to implement. Nonetheless, 
Vietnam’s hedging behavior illustrates a pattern that Hanoi leadership prefers a strategic 
balance of power structure between the United States and China. Furthermore, Vietnam’s 
gradual increase of indirect-balancing and dominance-denial behaviors signifies the degree 
of power rejection, as they both fit within Kuik’s spectrum of balancing-leaned hedging 
strategy vis-à-vis China. This strategy, thereby, provides Vietnam with greater distribution 
of benefits while alleviating any associated risks of disappointing the other power. Future 
Vietnamese foreign policies may promote the inclusion of increased security cooperation 
and greater levels of strategic partnerships with states that play significant roles in 
maintaining peace and stability in Southeast Asia.  
 
 
                                                 
276 Kuik, “How Do Weaker States Hedge? Unpacking Asean States’ Alignment Behavior Towards 
China,” 505. 
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